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PREFACE

While reading Studs Terkel's Hard Times, for a seminar in 197**» I
first encountered information about a farm rebellion in northwestern
Iowa during the Great Depression.

As a native of that part of Iowa, my

curiosity about this topic provoked further inquiry.

In general, the

farmer uprising of the 1930s was eventful for northwest Iowa and the
surrounding upper midwestern states.

Specifically, the rebellion

achieved considerable attention for events in Plymouth County, Iowa.
Having grown up only twenty miles from LeMars, the county seat of Plym
outh County, I became intrigued with the rebellion, its causes, and the
people involved in this episode of farmer activism.

As the result of an

idea sparked by a seminar reading, the topic of the Plymouth County farm
revolt grew into this thesis project.
In two contexts the Plymouth County farm revolt seems significant.
On the one hand, the county's uprising provides an interesting study of
local farmer activism.

Studied in the restricted limits of a single

county, special insights into the events, characters, and ideology of
rural rebellion can be gained.

But, there is also a broader Importance

in the Plymouth County farm revolt.

The local rebellion seems to be

linked to a long heritage of agricultural unrest in America.

Viewed in

this second context, there is more than Just a local importance to the
events of 1932-33 in the LeMars area.

Within the story of this local

farmer uprising are interesting lessons relative to America's agrarian
tradition.
iii

The completion of this project carries with it the customary
indebtedness.

Numerous librarians, teachers, county officials, and

Just private citizens, extended assistance without which this project
could not have been completed.

But, a special thank you is in order

for the one other person who believed strongly in the value of this
project.

Dr. William C. Pratt, as my adviser, showed exceptional

patience and guidance as he led me through the thesis process.

He

was a constant source of research ideas, and never gave up on this
thesis topic, even when the writer fell prey to such temptations.
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CHAPTER r
THE FARMERS* HOLIDAY MOVEMENT
IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN AGRARIANISM
A strong agrarian protest movement emerged, in the midvest during the
early 1930s• In Iowa, scattered Incidents of farm protest surfaced from
1931 through 1933*

Sometimes organized, frequently undisciplined, this ^

rural insurgency achieved its greatest notoriety in Plymouth County in
northwestern Iowa, from August, 1932, until May, 1933.^

Under the banner-

of the Farmers' Holiday Association, economically depressed farmers agi
tated for relief*

During that ten month period, farmers resorted, to

actions ranging from purposeful strikes to uncontrolled violence*

The

1930s agrarian uprising in Plymouth County , studied alone,, is an inter
esting and important page in America's depression era history.

However,

the story of this instance- of farm rebellion: has a broader significance.A. fuller appreciation of the- rural unrest of the 1930s generally, and in
Plymouth County specifically, can be achieved by placing it In the his
torical context of both group direct action and the American agrarian..
tradition.

2

^John L. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, (Urbana: Uhiversity of Illinois
Press, 1965)1 and Lovell K. Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," (Columbia
Uhiversity r Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1968).
■p
^Examinations of direct action and violence on the part- or European
rural crowds by George Rude and E. JV Hobsbavm suggest even broader im
plications for studies of rural upheaval. Similarities in the crowd
phenomena of Iowa farmer protests in the 1930s and rural protest from the
1

2

American agricultural history contains a rich tradition of unrest
and direct action.

In colonial times, Bacon*s Rebellion in Virginia,

and the Regulator Movement in North Carolina, symbolized rural protest
against unfavorable political and economic conditions.

Later, in Shays*

Rebellion in Massachusetts and the whiskey tax resistance in Pennsylvania,
farmers gave further demonstrations of rural discontent and direct ac
tion. ^

From the Civil War until World War I agricultural movements under

went a transition from independent, isolated agrarian activism to an
organizational period which witnessed the emergence of the Grange, the
Farmers* Alliance, the People’s Party, the Farmers* Union, and the Amerlean Society for Equity.

It was from this general heritage of farmer

direct action and organization that the Farmers* Holiday Association
developed in the early 1930 s.
The Farmers’ Holiday Association served as the organizational base
for an important chain of events in Plymouth County in 1932 and 1933.

eighteenth through early twentieth century In England and France will be
discussed in Chapter IV, footnote 32, p. 7^, and Chapter VII. George
Rude* The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in Francs
and England, 1730-18U8^ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 196 U),pp.
33-^7; and E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of
Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (New York: Frederick
Praeger, 1963).
Oscar T. Barck, Jr. and Hugh T. Lefler, Colonial America, (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 197-200 and U86 -8 8 .
^Jackson Turner Main, The Ant1-Federalists: Critics of the Constitu
tion, 1781-1788, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1 9 6 1 ),
PP* 59-^3; and John C. Miller, The Federalist Era, 1790-1801, (New York:
Harper and Row, i9 6 0 ), pp. 155-63.
^Wayne C. Rohrer and Louis H. Douglas, The Agrarian Transition in
America, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. UI-U3 .

Thus, a superficial connection is established betveen the depression farm
rebellion anI earlier agrarian movements.

In fact, some tactics-employed

by the Holiday movement were identical to those used over thirty years
earlier in the Populist movement in western Iowa.

However; the rela

tionship is not so simple as merely reciting organizational ancestry and
previous farmer activism.

Two contending forces are at work in the his

tory of American agriculture.

First, there are the traditional values

and ideals of the independent yeoman farmer upholding the old rural folk
ways.

Second, and developing gradually in the American experience, has

been the need for farmers, to innovate and organize to meet the: challenges
of new conditions and problems.

7

In order to build an understanding of

the development of rural activism in the 1930s , one must' explore the:
evolution of these primary forces in American agriculture...
Paul H. Johnstone's analysis of the agrarian tradition in America is
Q
instructive.
Johnstone asserts that the literary works of Thomas Jeff
erson, Hector St. Jean de Crevecoeur, and others, molded an ideal about
country people and country life in American society.
portrayed as a simple, honest, industrious individual.

The farmer was
This ideal took

the form of an American agrarian creed based on three principles.

First

was the concept of the economically independent American farmer.

Second,

^Herman C. Nixon, "The Economic Basis of The Populist Movement in
Iowa,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, 21 (July, 1923); 391**
^Paul H. Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas in Farm Life,”
Farmers In a Changing World: Yearbook of Agriculture. 19^0, (Washington;
United States Government. Printing Office, 19^0); 116.
%bid. Johnstone's findings, written in 19^0, are particularly use
ful since his perspective on agrarian traditions came immediately after
the Holiday movement of 1932-1933.

k

the creed held that agriculture vas the central feature in an economic
system around which all other activity revolved.

Third, and of greatest

importance, was the view that agricultural life was a natural state of
heing and therefore good.

In the scheme of this creed it developed that

rural life was good and city life was had.

Thus established in an un9
written creed was the classical rural-urban antagonism.
Prior to the Revolution the agrarian creed may have held a measure
of validity in American life.

After that time, however, thoroughgoing

changes in American economics rendered it impractical.

Richard Hofstadter

suggests that the agrarian creed represents a tribute to the country’s
rural origins, but by the turn of the nineteenth century it was no ‘longer
applicable and became the "agrarian myth".

It was a myth in the sense

that it, "so effectively embodies men’s values that it profoundly influ
ences their way of perceiving reality and hence their behavior.
*

Hofstadter convincingly demonstrates the lasting impact of the "agrarian
myth" by depicting its presence in the twentieth century.

In fact, with

the passage of time, the myth, though further from reality, became more
\

entrenched in many rural American minds.

11

Milo Reno, nominal leader of

the striking farmers in 1 9 3 2 , reflected the mythical agrarian values when
he declared that the Farm Holiday movement was "a protest of the assump
tion that the money lords of the nation have a right to increase their
9 Ibid,, pp. 116 -1 8 .

■^Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, (New York:
1955), p. 2k .
1 :LIbid., pp. 30-31.

Random House,

5

already swollen fortunes by a systematic robbing of those who produce the
wealth. ” 12

Also touching on the rural notions about the central role of

agriculture in American society, a Plymouth County farm leader pushed the
Holiday idea by proclaiming "the sleeping giant, agriculture, must be
roused if it’s going to save itself."1^

Perhaps the most genuine reflec

tion of the "agrarian myth" in the Holiday movement came in the lines of
a poem in the Iowa Union Farmer, which urged,
Let’s call a farmers* holiday
A holiday let’s hold
We’ll eat our wheat and ham and eggs
And let them eat their gold.1^
With such sentiments as these, century old rural beliefs were an important
part of the 1930 s farm protest, as farmers struggled with monumental changes
in the economic system.
Commercialization, industrialization, and urbanization of the American
economy were the fundamental changes forced upon the agrarian tradition.
As the American farmer moved from the eighteenth through the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century, he saw his legendary self-sufficiency
yield to economic interdependence.

Improved seeds, mechanical devices,

and farming techniques required capital, so the farmer began to raise
crops beyond the subsistence level to sell in the market place to raise
money for technological improvements.
12

If the sale of produce did not

Iowa Union Farmer, August 2 k , 1932.

1^LeMars Globe-Post, May 23, 1932.
lli

Iowa Union Farmer, March 9* 1932.

6
raise sufficient capital, the fanner indebted himself to the local busi
nessmen and bankers.

This commercialization of agriculture basically

during the nineteenth century made the farmer increasingly dependent on
urban middlemen.1^

The creed that had contributed to the rural-urban

antagonism alluded to earlier was given substance by nineteenth century
developments.^
The nineteenth century farmer did not oppose the growth of indus
trialism and commercialism.

Johnstone suggests that he embraced it be

cause he gave great credence to an idea of progress which was the assump'tion that natural law compelled man and society to "go on improving in
definitely".^

Faith in. progress was easily sustained because the

agrarian ideal; foresaw the triumph of good.

Since* according to the-

agrarian creed* the agricultural life was good* the farmer would eventually
triumph.1®
This optimism about the future on the part of nineteenth century
farmers bred a boom psychology.

Agricultural land values had consistently

risen in the American experience and Increases in land values were occa
sionally dramatic.

Based on a faith in rising land values and the idee

of progress, farmers came to rely on the appreciation of their lands for
profits rather than on the income from produce sales.

A natural, outgrowth

15
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 38-39 •
^Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus Hew Ideas*" pp. 118-19.
1Tn>ld. . p. 12U.
l8Tbld.. p. 128.

7
of the steadily increasing land values was speculation in lands. 19

An

underlying assumption persisted that unlimited growth and expansion were
natural and to be expected.

By the mid-nineteenth century the speculative

nature of these beliefs led to an agricultural devotion to land values
rather than to the land itself.

It was such speculation and boom psycho

logy that led to many of the agriculural evils in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century.

20

The second half of the nineteenth century brought accelerated and
dramatic changes to American agriculture.
with stunning rapidity.
of an entire region.

Technological advances occurred

The Civil War devastated the agricultural economy

Slowly there was an exhaustion of the good land

supply. American agriculture grew increasingly reliant on foreign markets
and domestic suppliers.

Also distressing to the rural tradition was the

rural-urban migration which eventually resulted in a majority of the
nation's population residing in urban areas.

In response to these political

and economic stimuli significant alterations in rural philosophy and
perceptions emerged.
New perceptions by farmers at the close of the nineteenth century
fall into several distinct catagories.

First, and of primary importance,

the farmer was in the process of becoming a minority in American society
and came to view himself as an underdog.

In this new role the farmer

19

Lowell K. Dyson, "Was Agricultural Distress in the 1930s a Result
of Land Speculation During World War I? The Case of Iowa," Annals of
Iowa, 40 (Spring, 1971): 580-82; Nixon, "The Economic Basis of The
Populist Movement in Iowa," pp. 377-79; and William G. Murray, "Pros
perity and Land Boom, 1901-1920," The Palimpsest, 48 (October, 196?)s
461-80.
20
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 41-42; and Johnstone, "Old Ideals
Versus New Ideas," pp. 129-32.

8

perceived himself as "being pitted against urban monopolists and intemational monetary conspirators.

21

The idea of the agrarian underdog in a

struggle with urban elements was not hard to sustain. ' Farmers saw numer
ous examples of unfair practices by railroads, grain elevators, and banks.
Rural money and credit problems abounded in the 1880s and 1890s.
same problems surfaced again in the twentieth century.

22

These

Speaking in the

tradition of farmer as underdog, Farm Holiday spokesman Bob Moore appealed
to a group of northwest Iowa farmers in 1932 by saying, "When the interna
tional harvester people need some money to buy more diamonds or poodle dogs
for their wives they just add a dollar or two to the price of a harvester
23
and Uncle Reuben at the crossroads pays the extra price." ^
As the farmers' numerical status in society changed, so also did
attitudes about the traditional values of rural life.

At one time it was

deemed honorable to be of rural origins because it suggested an understand
ing of the humble.

However, by the end of the nineteenth century, rural

origins were perceived as a station in life from which one should rise.
Within this change in perceptions, a sentimental shift occurred in which
approval was no longer attached to lowly, rural origins, but rather
24
to the people who rose from them.
Slowly the farmer grew to see him
self as an unesteemed character.
21

Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 62-81.

pp

Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1953)» P* 19*
. W. Forster and W. C. Weldon, "The Agricultural Problem," Social
Forces, March, 1933» P* 370.
24

Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas," p. 1^9* For a discussion
of rural origins of early twentieth century reformers, see Wayne E. Fuller,
"The Rural Origins of the Progressive Leaders," Agricultural History,

9

In the agrarian tradition, the antagonism "between town and country
has already been noted.

The basic animosity was historic, but late

nineteenth century conditions sharpened the conflict.

The intense com

mercialization of agriculture between 1865 and 1900 brought into focus
a sharp clash between farmers and middlemen.

Farmers came to see the

middlemen as price fixers and supply manipulators.

At least partly

because of this perception, some farmers tried to learn how they might
serve their own purposes through cooperative endeavors.

25

Although farmers harbored a fundamental dislike for the middleman,
they began to adopt his business techniques.

By the late nineteenth

century, with the days of self-sufficiency gone, the farmer began to
specialize, producing that which was most appropriate for his given
skills, climate, soil, and markets.

As farming was increasingly recog

nized as a business, efficiency was sought.

Development along these

lines brought record-keeping into the farmers1 domain.

26

The sophisti

cation of agricultural bookkeeping brought about the ability to calculate
costs and thus income needs.

By the time of the Farm Holiday movement,

some farmers were calculating and demanding the "cost-of-production" for
their agricultural produce.

27

Indeed, farming had moved from an era of

family subsistence to one of small and, in some cases, large business.

1*2 (January, 1968): 1-13. Fuller contends that many Progressive leaders
came from rural origins and took from those origins important attitudes
that developed into some of the major reforms of the early twentieth cen
tury. Unfortunately, Fuller notes, the significant role of rural origins
has been lost in the history of the Progressive Era.
25Ibid., pp. 158-59.
2 ^Ibld,, pp. lUU—U5 ,
2 TIbld,, p. lUU.

10

Another new perception by the rural community in the last three de
cades of the nineteenth century had a profound effect on the agrarian
tradition.

Farmers began to organize to meet the challenges of an indus

trial society.

The first important organization* the Grange, was' designed

for social and fraternal purposes, but a structure was provided for polit-

ical protest that eventually brought some state regulation of businesses.

28

In the l880s* the Alliance movement spread in the agricultural sector.
Lawrence Goodvyn contends that the Alliance cooperative idea brought "a
new way of thinking” to agricultural organizations.^

Driven by economic.,

hardship*, farmers began to shed some of their traditional independence
and cooperated in marketing and purchasing endeavors . In this cooperative,
movement, farmers perceived the potential for political action*?0

Polit

ical activism was realized in the Populist movement of the 1890s.

Al

though the Populists lacked a formal and coherent philosophy, their* ideals,
brought together the perceptions of American agriculture at the turn of
the century.

Grant McConnell points out that Populist goals "were not

narrow class demands.”

Rather, they were a sincere attempt to ensure the-

farmers * position in the political system. 3^ Politically frustrated and
oA
Ibid., pp. 133-3**; and Rohrer and Douglas, Agrarian Transition in
America, p. 56.

29
^Lawrence Goodvyn* Democratic Promise? The Populist Movement In
America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp, xi-xii.
30Ibld., p. 177.
^Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 60-93.
3^McConnellThe Decline of Agrarian Democracy, p. 5.

11

divided, the Populist movement crumbled in the late 1890s, hut not before
many farmers came to recognize the political potential of agrarian organ
izations.
The new sense of agricultural organization had its shortcomings.
professional farm leadership developed from this movement.
was sometimes nurtured by the farm organizations.

A

The leadership

Often it grew from

governmental agencies such as the land grant colleges, the Department of
Agriculture, and the county agent system.

What was significant for the

farmers was that all too often the experts attempting to lead and help
with his problems were not farmers themselves, but rather were urban
agricultural leaders.

Even if they had been farm-reared their profession

alization had caused them to become urban.

Whether created by the farmers’

own organization, or by governmental agencies, professional farm leadership was often suspect. °

Perhaps the corollary was that agricultural

organizations themselves were weakened structurally because of this dis
trust.

Despite the shortcomings in early farm organization leadership,

an important lesson had been learned by rural people.

The problems

created by the new industrial society in the late nineteenth century
necessitated an organizational rather than a personal approach to solu
tions.

Farmers understood the new organizational requirements and acted

upon them. 3**

Ibid., pp. U5-^8; and Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas, pp.
156-57.
^Samuel P. Hays, The Response To Industrialism, 1885-191**» (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 58-63.

12

In the twentieth century, the Farmers* Union, the Society for Equity,
and the Farm Bureau, were the large member groups that carried on the
organizational efforts of American agriculture.

35

Generally, the first

twenty years of the new century were good agriculturally.

But when the

wartime boom turned to postwar readjustment and then to depression at the
end of the 1920s, American agriculture was once again faced with economic
hardship.

Farm organizations united to push the McNary-Haugen Bill in

the 1920s as a solution to low prices.

But the far reaching economic

problems were beyond simple and quick solution.

As agricultural problems

mounted in the early years of the depression, desperate farmers searched
for new direction.

It was in this setting that the Farmers* Holiday

Association of the 1930s emerged.
The Farmers* Holiday Association was built on the idea that farmers
were unfairly treated in the economic system.

This economic fate could

be changed if the farmer were guaranteed prices that would cover his
cost of production.

When the "cost-of-produetion" claim was ignored

after several years of preaching its virtue, a group of Farmers* Union
leaders formed the Farmers* Holiday Association.

The new association

proclaimed that if the cost of production ideal was not met, member
farmers would go on strike withholding their produce from market until
such demands were met.
37

1932. 1

Such a strike was officially called in August,

The events of the strike and actions that ensued during the

35
Rohrer and Douglas, Agrarian Transition in America, pp. 57-60.
^George N. Peek, "The McNary-Haugen Plan for Relief," Current
History, November, 1928, pp. 273-78.
37
'John L. Shover, "The Farmers* Holiday Association Strike, August,
1932," Agricultural History, 39 (October, 1965): 196-98.
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succeeding ten months are subjects for later discussion.

For present pur

poses the general ideals of the Farmers* Holiday Association suggested
above provide the connection of this 1930 s rural rebellion with the
agrarian traditions of the preceding century.
In a general sense, the Farmers* Holiday maintained many traditional
rural ideas about the farmer and his position in society.

The farmer was

perceived as the underdog in society, and he suffered economically.

He

had a fundamental part in the American economy, as evidenced by the vision
that a strike would serve to show the importance of his agricultural pro
duction.

Milo Reno probably overstated, but reflected farmer attitudes,

when he editorialized that the Holiday movement was actually an "economic
ofl
revolution.'
Further expression of this view surfaced at a Holiday
rally in Plymouth County where farmers boosted a sign, proclaiming that
"The Farmer is the Life Blood of the Small Town— If He don’t Get Production
Costs We are all Sunk."^9

Sentiments such as these emanated almost di

rectly from the "agrarian myth".

Specifically, the agricultural problems

of the twentieth century were caused in part because of rural attitudes
developed in the nineteenth century.

For example, the boom psychology of

the previous century persisted from 1900-1920.

Such thinking fostered

land speculation that was one major source of farm problems in the 1920 s
and 1930s. 1*0

^Iowa Union Farmer, February 10, 1933.
^Ibid., August 10, 1932, p. U.
1*°Dyson, "Was Agricultural Distress In The 1930s A Result, of Land
Speculation During World War I? The Case of Iowa," pp. 578-79; and
Murray, "Prosperity and Land Boom, 1901-1920," pp. U61-80.

lU

The Farmers* Holiday also incorporated other newer" perceptions about
rural life developed by late nineteenth century farmers.

The overriding

view that the Holiday movement borrowed from the late agrarian tradition
was the recognition of the need to organize.

The new association utilized

the organizational structure of the Farmers* Union which, suggests Grant
McConnell, was a direct descendant from the Populist tradition.

Ul

In its

strike program, the Holiday broadened the cooperative ideas of the nine—
teenth century Alliance crusade.

Member farmers united to withhold the

supply" of produce from market, thus hoping to. drive depressed prices up
ward!.

The- cooperative marketings idea was widely practiced by the 1930sr

and. the Holiday withholding idea was a logical extension of the coopera
tive spirit on the supply side of agricultural economlcsv
Although the Farmersr Holiday Association demonstrated erratic: behav
ior during Its brief; existence, it generally patterned itself after nine
teenth century rural organizations.

The fundamental leadership of the-

Holiday movement traced its roots to the agrarian crusade of the previous
century.. Milo Reno, the principal founder and leader of the Holiday
Association, had been an activist in the Greenback and Populist organizations
[.rt-

of the l880s and 1890s .

A Journalist interviewed Reno and found him to be

an organizational fundamentalist with ideas dating back, to the agrarian
crusade of 1870-1890.^
^Julius Korgan, "Farmers Picket The. Depression,” (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, American University, 1961), p. 31; and McConnell, The Decline
of Agrarian Democracy, p. 38.
U2

Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 25.

^3James Rorty, "How Radical. Are The Farmers?”, The Nation, January 23,
1935, p. 10U.

15
A final significant rural attitude that developed in the nineteenth
century and carried over to the Farm Holiday movement was the anti
middleman sentiment.

Of course, the middlemen were seen as key factors

in the farmers' escalated cost of production in the 1920s and 1930s.
animosity was engendered.

Thus

As the Holiday movement progressed, the opposi

tion to the middleman became more refined.

Generally the middleman was

perceived as the direct economic enemy of the farmer.

Specifically, farm

ers came to vent their anger at those middlemen who showed no apparent
sympathy for the farmers' plight.

Along these lines, holders of farm

mortgages such as bankers and insurance companies, or their defenders,
were the recipients of Holiday anti-middleman attacks.

The mortgage

holders of the 1930 s had replaced the railroads and grain companies of
an earlier agricultural age.
Richard Hofstadter suggests that the agrarian ideals of this country
are important, not because they are true or correct, but because they
have been believed.^

The rural protesters in Plymouth County in the

1930s found credence in their inherited rural traditions.

What happened

there fits a broader picture of American rural history.
In its active phase, particularly in Plymouth County, the Farm
Holiday movement soon broke down.

But it represented much of the rich

tradition in American agrarian history.

The farmers' vision of himself

as an essential part of the American economy was apparent in this rebel
lion.

The tradition of the farmer versus the middleman also found

support in Plymouth County in the 1930s.
UU

Perhaps the most important

Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 23 -2 8 .

16
tradition inherited by the Holiday was the tendency to organize to solve
problems.

It was from the organizational base that, once set in motion,

the Farmersf Holiday movement achieved notoriety and made the events in
Plymouth County in 1932 and 1933 a noteworthy episode in American agrarian
history.

Although in the stream of American history the farm revolt in

Plymouth played a small role, the uprising did not happen in a vacuum.
To the contrary, it was part of an important evolution in the American
agrarian tradition.

It is in this general vein that the 1930s farm rebel

lion should be examined.

CHAPTER II

THE 1930S FARM REBELLION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY

By the spring of 1932, the United States was in the midst of economic
depression.
mounted.

In agriculture, as elsewhere, the hardships of the. depression

Farmers in Plymouth County, Iowa, saw the price of c om, their

basic crop, sink to thirty-two cents per bushel by the beginning of May.

n

This price decline represented a 25 percent decrease since early January.^
During 1932 ,almost 6 percent of farms in Iowa changed ownership due to
bankruptcy or foreclosure.

Responding to this economic crisis, Iowa

farmers formed an organization on May 3, 1932, popularly known as the
Farmers' Holiday.*4 This movement received widespread national attention
in the ensuing thirteen months.

Normally conservative farmers employed

strikes, roadside blockades, picketing, threatened lynchings, and inter
fered with legal processes.

Nowhere was the activity of the Farmers'

Holiday more intense than in northwestern Iowa, and at the center of the
farmers' revolt was Plymouth County.^

The conditions, circumstances, and

events of this important local farm rebellion are the focus of this inves
tigation.

^LeMars Globe-Post, May 2, 1932.
2

Ibid., January U, 1932.

^Shover, "The Farmers' Holiday Association Strike," p. 196.
**Des Moines Register. May U, 1932, p. 1.
5Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. U-5.
IT
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Plymouth County is located on the western border .of Iowa, Just to
the north of Sioux City*

In fact, the boundary of Plymouth was within a

few miles of the city limits of Sioux City in the 1930s.

Sioux City,

with a population of approximately 79*000 in 1930, served as the* major
trade center and agricultural market for the three state area of northwestern Iowa* southeastern South Dakota, and northeastern Nebraska.

6

Map 2 on the following page graphically demonstrates Sioux City*s central
location.

The grain terminals, stockyards, and meat packing industry of

the city provided the lure for agricultural products of the region. Run—
i
ning through Plymouth County and into Sioux City was United States High
way 75.

In the 1930s, this hard-surfaced road provided the major

farm-to-market transportation route for agricultural, products from
numerous northwestern Iowa counties.

Thus situated, Plymouth County

was the.passageway for regional, agricultural trade.- In this geographical,
setting, the Farmers' Holiday achieved its most marked successes and
failures..
"For agriculture as a whole," Sidney Baldwin notes, "the Great
Depression, began not on the fateful day in October, 1929, but in 1920,
when farm commodity prices suddenly collapsed and the war-time boom
dissolved."^

Farmers* organizations struggled throughout the. 1920s with

a bleak economic outlook.

The principal agrarian organizations of the

1920s were, in order of size, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the

Yorkt

^Federal Writers* Project, Iowa: A Guide To The Hawkeye State.- (New*
Viking Press, 1938), pp. 229 and 1*22.
*

T
'Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics:
Farm Security Administration, (Chapel Hill:
Press, 1968), p. 32.
‘

The Rise and Decline, of the
University of North Carolina;
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National Grange, and the Farmers’ Educational and Cooperative Union, com
monly known as the Farmers’ Union,

The Farm Bureau focused its attention

on attempting to make tariffs effective.

While the Grange also sought a

tariff remedy, it urged direct government subsidies to agriculture.

The

Farmers’ Union, the third largest of the farm organizations, traditionally
pursued a low-keyed political course of action, concentrating instead on
cooperative endeavors.

But>by the mid-1920s,the Union also turned toward

direct political action seeking federal assistance to alleviate the farmQ
ers’ economic woes.
Efforts by these organizations to solve agriculture’s
economic problems, and particularly the re-establishment of the Farmers’
Union as an activist farm organization, set the stage for the farm rebel
lion episode in 1932-33.
In the early 1920s, some elements of the Farmers' Union began to
advance ideas suggesting that farmers should be guaranteed agricultural
commodity prices that equalled their cost of producing such goods.

Milo

Reno, president of the Iowa Farmers* Union, urged state and national
farm leaders to call together all farm organizations supporting the
"cost-of-production" idea.

Reno succeeded in advancing his idea in 1925

when twenty-four farm groups Joined in the Corn Belt Committee.

In

general, the committee subscribed to the "cost-of-production" idea.

How

ever, when the McNary-Haugen bill, the chief agricultural relief measure
of the 1920s, was twice vetoed and the Agricultural Marketing Act passed
^William R. Johnson, "National Farm Organizations and the Reshaping
of Agricultural Policy in 1932," Agricultural History, 37 (January, 1963):
35-36; and Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent
in the Middle West, 1900-1939* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1951), p. 238.

21

as a substitute,, the concord between, farm groups broke*

Factional divi

sions brought an end to the C o m Belt Committee in 1931.

The Farmers *

Union, instigator of the Corn Belt Committee, itself became the arena of
struggle over the course of action agrarian organizations should take in
the 1930s.9
Within the Farmers* Union, two groups vied for power in the early'
1930s.

One group supported the long-standing cooperative marketing

ideals of the Union and generally represented grain-producing areas.
In opposition was an element generally representing livestock areas and'
led by Milo Reno*- Reno's sympathies were clear.

In 1927 he announced:

that "if'we cannot obtain Justice by legislation, the time will have
arrived when no other course remains than organized refusal to deliver
the products: of the farm at less than production costs."-*-® The "cost—
of-productionlf"plan , as outlined by Reno , was a program in which an.
average farm operator would, be guaranteed a price for his products equal
to his cost of producing the goods, plus an allowance- for his labor and
a reasonable profit
The Farmers* Union generally subscribed to the "cost-of-production"
idea, but Reno's1plan of a withholding movement aroused little support
at first.

Then in 1931, a political faction of the-Union, representing

livestock producing areas and thoroughly dissatisfied with Hoover's,
9Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, pp. 19-21.
^°Shoverv "Farmers' Holiday Association Strike," p. 19T.
^Philip Stevenson,. "Reno's Cost of Production— An Explanation,"
Common Sense. April 13, 1933, p. 10; and Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion,. p . 22-
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agricultural program, gained authority with John Simpson’s election to
the presidency.

The leader of the National Farmers' Union was now a man

sympathetic to Reno's views.

Because a withholding movement might endan

ger extensive cooperative "business interests, and because in the event of
a strike Reno's political faction would risk its leadership of the organi
zation, the Farmers' Union could not officially endorse the withholding
scheme.

But Reno, operating through the Iowa Farmers' Union even though

he was no longer its president, found support and advice from friendly
1p

officials of the national organization as depression conditions worsened. ^
In early 1932,he moved throughout the upper midwest states seeking sup
port for the withholding movement idea.

Glen Miller, elected Iowa Farm

ers* Union president in 1932, citing numerous recent bank closings,
declared that if banks could call holidays so could farmers.

13

Thus the

popular term "farmers' holiday" was coined for the proposed withholding
movement.
The organizing campaign reached a high point with the meeting of
2000 farmers in Des Moines, on May 3, to innaugurate the Farmers' Holiday
Association.

Reno became national president of the association and plans

called for a withholding movement to start on July U.

l4

Because of or

ganizational problems and temporary price gains in early July, the move
ment did not begin until August.
^Shover, "Farmers* Holiday Association Strike," p. 197*

13ioVa Union Farmer, February 10, 1932.
lUIbid., May U, 1932.
^^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 31.
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The interval between the establishment of the Farmers* Holiday Asso
ciation on May 3» and the official call for a farm strike on August 8,
found Iowa association leaders busy generating local support.

During the

summery Reno, advocated direct action as he preached the virtues of the
farm strike across Iowa*^

Other leaders also travelled extensively to

promote the idea of a farm strike*
Holiday leader visitations to Plymouth County were numerous, and.
organizational meetings of the Farmers * Holiday were well covered in the
LeMars Globe-Post* As early as April U , a township meeting of the Farm
ers * Union agreed, to a buying: and selling stoppage as outlined by Plym
outh County Farmers* Union.president C. J. Schultz*?*^

By late May, the

Farmers * Union was advertising local meetings for* an explanation, of the
Farm Holiday by Iowa Farmers* Union secretary Bob Moore*

l ft

On June 13V-

Jesse SIckler, secretary* of the Farmers* Holiday Association of Iowa,
spoke at a meeting in Kingsley in the southeastern, portion of the county*
and a week later Moore addressed a crowd of 800 to 900 in LeMars.?-^

With.,

the LeMars Globe-Post editorially endorsing the Farm Holiday, and regularly
publishing accounts of holiday meetings, the farmers of Plymouth County
were well-informed of the general intent of the ideas behind the strike*
^ D y s o n " T h e Farm Holiday Movement,1* p. 73*
^^LeMars Globe-Post. April
% d . . May 26, 1932.
^I b i d . J u n e 9 and 23, 1932*
2QIbid. * July 11, 1932.

1932*
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2k

The Farmers1 Holiday Association officially began a movement to with
hold agricultural, products from market on August 8, 1932.2^

The focal

point of the strike was Sioux City, but early newspaper reports indicated
little success.

i

po

Two days into the strike, talk emerged that farmers
po
might resort to picketing the highways to further their cause. J The

picketing idea was probably related to the sudden emergence of a separate
milk strike in the Sioux City area.
The f a m strike of August, 1932, received a boost with the emergence
of the Sioux City Milk Producers’ Cooperative.

Twenty-eight angered

dairy farmers organized a Producers’ Cooperative Association in May, 1932.2k
By August the association claimed 900 members- The chairman of the group
was I- W. Reck of Plymouth County-

Two other Plymouth County residents,

Sam Mosher and Cliff McNaughton, were early-leaders of the milk producers.25^
These dairy farmers asked to be paid $2.17 per hundred pounds for milk",, a:
significant increase over the. $1.00 they currently were receiving.

The

chief nemesis* of the milk producers was the powerful J.. R. Roberts Dairy
Company of Sioux City.

Similar to the Farmers1 Holiday Association action,

milk producers resorted to a milk strike on August 11, to press their
p/T

demands.
2^Iowa Union Farmer, August 10, 1932.
22Sloux City Journal. August 9* 1932, p. 2.
23rbia., August 10, 1932, p. 2.
pji

Korgan, ’’Farmers Picket The Depression,” p. 35.
25john L. Shover Papers, Special Collections Department, University
Of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa, pp. 1-3.
2^Sloux City Journal. August 11, 1932.
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The hard times shared by the milk producers and the Farmers' Holiday,
and their struggle for change, brought the two groups together*

C. J.

Schultz, Plymouth County Farmers' Holiday Association president, stated,
"the milk producers' strike is not an organized part of the farm holiday
movement, but it has the support and sympathy of every farmer who would■

i

like to see himself and his neighbors get the cost of production."
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The co-existence of the two organizations has been pointed, out by Lowell
Dyson*
The dairy farmers wanted an efficient blockade to force the
distributors to the bargaining table; but even more, the Farm
ers' Holiday Association needed a dramatic demonstration: of.
its potential power* No evidence exists to prove that one
organization pushed the other into overt action; the question::
is moot, however, since many of the milk producers had enlisted
in Milo Reno's group. Sam Mosher, for example, served as an
official in both associations
On August 15, the Sioux City Journal reported the first; Incident of'
hundreds of striking farmers blocking the highways* to Sioux City*. The
largest group of strikers gathered at the Plymouth County line with reports
that "no trucks carrying livestock or milk had been allowed to pass."^
This action was carried on by the milk producers and, the Farmers ' Holiday
so it was "difficult to determine who was conducting the- strike*”

By

mid-August, in Plymouth County as elsewhere around Sioux City, the holding
action declared by the Farmers' Holiday was entangled with the milk
^LeMars Globe-Post * August 11, 1932.
28
Dyson, "Farm Holiday Movement," p. 80*
29sioux City Journal* August l£, 1932, p. 7.
3°Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. UO.
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producers' strike, indicating that Milo Reno's organization did not com
pletely dictate the direction and method of the farm revolt.

In fact,

even Reno's leadership was questioned by a reporter who visited the picket
lines and found that, vhile "sitting around the fire vith picketers Reno's
name was mentioned only once."31
A further indication of the inability of the Farmers' Holiday Asso
ciation to control the August strike was the impulsive eruption of overt
farmer action.

Shover writes that "although specific leaders may have

set the protest in motion, the farm strike was a spontaneous effort pur
suing immediate and sometimes irrational goals, different from those of
the

leaders.

”3^

Direct action in Plymouth County involved such incidents

as two men pouring 300 pounds of milk from a Cherokee Creamery truck.^
At Kingsley, farmers called on grain elevators and attempted to persuade
*

them to quit buying farm produce, and persuaded some farmers to return home
with their grain. ^

Also at Kingsley, farmers seized five milk trucks and

planned to distribute the milk among the

poor.

35

in order to stop trucks

bound for Sioux City, cables were stretched across a bridge.

Other Plym

outh County farmers attempted to temporarily eliminate the middleman in
31josephine Herbst, "Feet In The Grass Roots," Scribner's, January,
1933, pp. U6-U7 .

^Shover, "Farmers' Holiday Association Strike," p. 202.
33sioux City Journal, August 13, 1932.
3**LeMars Globe-Post, August 11, 1932, p. 6.
^ Sioux City Journal, August 13, 1932.
36LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.

the distribution of certain farm products by selling produce door-to-door.^
Such door-to-door sales did not have the sanction of the Farmers' Holidays
Association, and were probably never the intention of the organization.
However, realizing the importance of this publicity, Milo Reno was quick to
praise Plymouth County farmers in their boycott of non-cooperating busi
nesses in LeMars.^®

Shover notes that although the impulsive actions were

unanticipated, "the spontaneous movement element that seized the initiative
from the Holiday leaders in northwest Iowa publicized the farmers' plight
and prompted, political, response more effectively theux any ill-organized
peaceful withholding

m o v e m e n t . "
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The Farmers' Holiday withholding action in Plymouth. County moved
immediately from its relatively peaceful early strike* activities to out
right direct action.

As the strike progressed through its first days, an...

illusion: of success gripped farmers In the- Sioux City area.

On August

15, reports indicated that numerous LeMars truckers had agreed not to haul,
agricultural products during the. holiday.^

Three days later, the LeMars

Chamber of Commerce agreed not to buy produce for the duration of the
strike.^

Out of Sioux City came reports of serious reductions, in live—
JlO

stock receipts due to the strike. ^

The news received national attention

in the New York Times, and other major newspapers
37sioux City Journal, August 15* 1932.
3flLeMars Globe-Post, August 18, 1932, p. k.

39shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 50.
^°LeMars Globe-Post. August 15, 1932.
^1Ibld., August 18, 1932.
Uo
Sioux City Journal. August IT, 1932.
York
27, 1932, p. 6.

Times, August 17, 1932, p. 2; and literary Digest. August
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Success in the farm strike vas temporary and fleeting * The optimis
tic reports above-belied the actual isituation. On August 20, the milk
producers arrived at a compromise settlement and declared a truce in
their strike.

kk

As a result, dairy farmer support for the Holiday was

seriously diminished.

A truer picture of the livestock receipts story

emerged on August 21.

Although receipts had been drastically reduced at

Sioux City, those at other midvestem livestock markets had Increased
markedly.
scope..

1*5*

The Holiday effort at Sioux City was simply too limited in

From late August on,, disheartened by the news of failure, some,

farmers turned to more forceful and violent actions^
In late August, Plymouth County Holiday members sought to broaden,
the offensive of" the strike movement.- Their efforts brought- close
scrapes with legal officials, and violence.

At Kingsley, local farmer*

Fired Blankenburg: was Jailed for throwing a wood plank: in front: of a car
load of deputies,, who were attempting to break up a picket line.

One-

hundred miles south of LeMars, farmers attempted to blockade the Omaha
market.

Picketing of other markets was Intended to eliminate the trans

fer of Sioux City area produce to other locations.

The Omaha blockade-

centered on the Iowa side of the Missouri River at Council Bluffs.
truck loads of Plymouth County farmers Joined the-blockade effort.

TwoUT

Several plcketers, including four from Plymouth County; were Jailed by
^ Sloux City Journal. August 20, 1932.
^Xbid., August 21, 1932, p. 2..
LeMars Globe-Post. August 18, 1932.
^Sioux City Journal. August 27, 1932, p.. 3.
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Pottawattamie County Sheriff Pat Lainson.

A recognized leader of the

picketers, Raymond Snyder of Plymouth County, threatened Lainson that if
ho
the pickets, were not freed "the farmers would storm the Jail*
Ten
sions eased at Council Bluffs when the prisoners were, released, following
a meeting of Holiday representatives and a.businessmens * group.

Three-

of the Holiday representatives were from Plymouth County, and at least
50
four prisoners were from the LeMars area*
Although the confrontation
at Council Bluffs was resolved, the presence and mood of an activist
group from Plymouth County was unmistakable.
On August 30,. violence erupted at- Cherokee, Iowa, although it was
not initiated by the Farmersr Holiday.
Plymouth County Is Cherokee County*

Located immediately east of

A group of Plymouth County Farm.

Holiday people* led by Morris Cope*, were soliciting Cherokee County
support in. the continuing strike effort*

During a country crossroads

meeting*. anti-Holiday forces* allegedly including the Cherokee County
Sheriff, drove past and shot into the Holiday group wounding fourteen
51
men*.

The violence at. Cherokee * directly involving Plymouth County"

**^New York Times, August 2T* 1932* p. 1*
^Sioux City Journal* August 26, 1932*
5°0maha World-Herald, August 25 and 26* 1932, p.- 1.
^lprank D* Dileva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa,” (Drake University:
Unpublished M. A. Thesis, 1952), p. 8U* Petitions signed by over 3000
residents of Plymouth and Cherokee Counties requested a state investiga
tion of the Cherokee shooting incident *. Three men* including the CherokeeCounty Sheriff, a former Cherokee policeman, and the president of a,
Cherokee bank* were indicted for the shooting. The first trial was not
held until. September, 1933, and no one was ever convicted in the shooting*
Perhaps the significance of this singular incident of violence was that
it demonstrated the pitched emotions surrounding the farm strike. Sioux
City Journal*. September 5, 1932; Pea Moines Register* September 12, 1933V
p.. 1; and Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," pp*. 89-92*
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organizers, brought a dramatic turn of events in the 1932 farm strike.
Humors circulated that area farmers planned to seal off Cherokee in
retaliation for the shooting incident.

Fearful that such reprisals

might get out of hand, state Holiday president John Chalmers announced
52
that "we will not jeopardize the lives of unarmed farmers."
Chalmers,
along with national Holiday president Reno, called a halt to the Farm
Holiday strike in Iowa on September 1 . ^
By early September, the inability of the Farmers * Holiday Associa
tion to control the strike was plain.

Although the strike had officially

ceased, a major road blockade incident occurred at James, Iowa, on the
Woodbury-Plymouth County line.

An estimated 1000 farmers gathered to

turn back a convoy of trucks being escorted to Sioux City by Plymouth
County Sheriff Ralph Rippey and a force of deputies.
ceeded in turning back the convoy.

The farmers suc

In so doing, farmers verbally abused

Rippey and forcefully removed the badges of many deputies.

No livestock

from Plymouth County arrived at the Sioux City stockyards that day. 5**
The depressed agricultural economic outlook and the increasing
violence and militance of the Holiday movement prompted a hastily called
governors* conference at Sioux City.

Four midwestern governors attended

the conference which met from September 9 to 11.
52
53

LeMars Globe-Post, September 5* 1932.
Sioux City Journal, September 1, 1932.

^ rbid., September 8, 1932.

Milo Reno spoke for

31

the Farmers* Holiday* Association and recommended a debt moratorium.

55

The governors submitted agricultural relief resolutions to President
Hoover. ^

Meanwhile, the farmers showed little faith in the entire pro

ceedings, as pickets ignored the strike cessation orders and remained on
Highway* 75 at James.

57

\-

Then, as suddenly as the farm strike had materialized, it faded.
58
By September 20, all roads into Sioux City were clear of pickets.
Talk
about resuming picketing in Plymouth County surfaced, but did not materialize.

59

Farmer activism temporarily disappeared*
I
harvesting season lured farmers back to their farms.

Perhaps the c o m
Whatever the rea

sons, the farm revolt quieted in Plymouth County until the winter and,
spring months when it re-emerged in. a different form.
From January* until April, 1933, with the farm strike- in the back
ground, farmers in Plymouth County turned their attention to the more
immediate problem of farm foreclosures.

Although the farm strike was

spectacular, the resistance to foreclosures and farm sales was more
significant.

60

Shover notes that,- Iffarmer- direct action was most vigor-

ous in the attempt to halt forced sales."

61 The farm strike demanded an

55ibid., September 11, 1932.. The governors in attendance at the
conference included-Dan Turner of Iowa, Warren Green of South Dakota,
Floyd Olson of Minnesota, and George Shafer of North Dakota. Representa
tives of governors from five other states also attended.
5^Ibld., September 12, 1932.
57rbid.. September 13, 1932.
50Ibid., September 21, 1932.
59i,eMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 23, 1932.
60john.A. Crampton, The National Farmers* Union,- (Lincoln:
of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 18.
^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 17.
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improvement in agricultural prices.

The anti-foreclosure movement repre

sented the farmers' desperate, last ditch effort to keep his farm and his
livelihood.
The movement to prohibit eviction of farmers from their farms had
been prophesied at the beginning of the Holiday.

A midvest Journalist

had declared in August of 1932, that "if the holiday ends with no real
results, the irritation of farm people against lov prices will not cease.
There will be another outbreak.

It may logically take the form of neigh

borhood defense against foreclosures.

Plymouth County practice pro-

vided that foreclosures take place at the courthouse in LeMars.

63

It

was there that farmers organized to block foreclosure sales in early
January, 1933.
Stories circulated that representatives of eastern banks vould be in
the county on January 1, to bid on farm land delinquent in tax payments.
A crowd of farmers, estimated at UOO to 500, gathered at the courthouse
in LeMars.

Either the bidders failed to appear or the farmers' presence

silenced them, because no bids were issued and the sale was postponed.
The farmers present organized and signed & petition to the state legisla6k
ture calling for a moratorium on all debts.
Two types of forced farm sales provoked direct farmer action in
Plymouth County.

A delinquent tax sale occurred when a farmer could not

pay the taxes on his land.

An auction customarily ensued in which the

^Donald R. Murphy, "The Farmers Go On Strike: The Blockade of
Sioux City," The New Republic, August 31* 1932, p. 6?.
^Charlotte Hubbard Prescott, "An Iova Foreclosure," The Nation,
February 22, 1933, p. 198.
^ LeMars Globe-Post. January 2, 1933.
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high bidder on the land received the land and the outstanding tax. obliga
tion.

Sales of this sort vere typically speculative actions, resulting

in bids below the real value of the property.

It was this type of tax

sale that failed to attract bidders on January 1, in LeMars.^
The deficiency judgment represented the- other type of forced farm
sale.

Deficiency judgments arose when a farmer could no longer meet his

mortgage payment. In such cases a forced sale resulted-

If no one bid

on the foreclosed property at the sale, the holder of the mortgage oftenbid on the property at less than the mortgage value.

Since the amount

bid fell below the mortgage value, a deficiency existed which would be
recovered by selling the farmer! ssimplements and household goods if
necessary- Such- Judgments were roundly despised because they took, fromthe farmer not only his land, but also the tools of his livelihood.
LeMars attorney Herbert S. Martin sought a deficiency judgment on
the farm of John A. Johnson on January U , 1933.
responded violently.
house.

Plymouth County*' farmers

Approximately 1000 farmers gathered at the court

When the sale beganr no bids were issued.

Martin represented

the mortgage holder, the New York Life Insurance Company.

As the repre

sentative,- Martin entered a sealed bid for $30,000. which amounted to
$3,000 less than the mortgage value and would have resulted in a deficiency
judgment against Johnson.
raise his bid.

The crowd of farmers pleaded with Martin to

Pleas turned to threats as one farmer dangled a rope.

Shouts of "lynch the bloodsucker I" and "hang him on a tree," were reported
Ibid.# January 5, 1933.
66Ibid.
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by the LeMars Globe-Post. Martin had no authority to change the bid and
so advised the farmers.

The angered farmers roughly handled the attorney

and insisted he contact the New York insurance company to get the bid
changed.

Martin obliged the farmers and advised the insurance company,

"my neck is at stake."
bid.

The insurance company complied and changed the

Feeling strength from their actions, the farmers carried their demon

stration to a local implement shop to retrieve another farmer's repossessed
tractor.

The implement shop locked its doors, but later reopened under
6T
threat of a boycott.
Back at the courthouse, District Judge C. W. Pitts' office had been
invaded by about a dozen angered farmers who insisted that he declare a
moratorium on farm foreclosures.

Pitts informed the farmers he had no

authority for such action, but that he would write the governor recommend
ing such an emergency measure.

While Pitts followed through on his promise,

local farmers also received a major increment of support when Plymouth
County attorneys agreed not to seek "any decree of foreclosure of land
mortgages until February 13, 1933."

68

The specter of violence had raised its head in Plymouth County once
again and local farmers had tasted its results.

At a mass meeting of

farmers in LeMars on January 7, one spokesman rendered the prophetic
announcement that they stood ready to stop forced sales, but "sometimes
the boys get out of hand."

69

Milo Reno recognized the contribution of

direct action, and praised the farmers* militance in a letter to C. J.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
^sioux City Journal» January 8, 1933, p. 2

TO
Schultz..

Although foreclosure stoppages were widespread, the Iowa

Union Farmer noted that "outstanding among the successes of the Holiday
was the massing of farmers at LeMars."

71 The mass gathering of farmers

in LeMars on January T» had special significance.

Mother Ella Reeve

Bloor, an organizer for the Communist Party, delivered, an address to the:
assembled farmers.

She asked the estimated 1000 farmers gathered to raise

their hands if they favored a march on the state capitol.
cated overwhelming support by the farmers.

Reports indi

Further significance in the

January 7 rally can be found in the confusion that began to emerge in the
local Holiday organization.- Although farmers attending the- rally indi
cated a willingness to march, on. Des Moines, local leadership took a dif
ferent position.

President C. J. Schultz: suggested the farmers were

"free to do as they like," but felt the movement would "be better served
72
if we stay right here and watch Plymouth County."
On February 8 , 1933 , the Iowa Legislature seemingly made direct
action against foreclosures unnecessary by passing a Mortgage Moratorium
Act.

The act gave discretionary powers to district Judges in foreclosure

matters.

73

Iowa Governor Clyde L. Herring went one step further by

70
Milo Reno to Lawrence Gaspar, January 10, 1933, Milo Reno Papers,
Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City,
Iowa.
71
Iowa Unlort Farmer. January 11, 1933 .
72
LeMars Globe-Post. January 9. 1933.
T^William g . Murray and Ronald C. Bentley , "Farm Mortgage Foreclosures*"
The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, ^Ames, Iowa: Collegiate Press, Incorporated, March, 1933), pp. 85-86. The surrounding states of Nebraska and.
Minnesota also passed mortgage moratorium laws in early 1933. Also, soma
major insurance companies announced a suspension of foreclosure proceedings'
on their behalf on a nationwide basis. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, pp. 8588
*

'
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requesting that insurance and mortgage companies postpone foreclosure
proceedings.

7U

For the remainder of the winter, farmers were appeased

and, although isolated instances of direct action occurred, the number
of incidents subsided.

West of LeMars, farmers halted a tuberculin test

on cattle being conducted by a state veterinarian.
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Farmers conducted

a "penny-sale" at the W. J. McKibbon farm on February 10, where only $^5
was bid by neighboring farmers on machinery valued at $2600.^

In such

sales, neighbors gathered to protect a farmer whose goods were being sold
under force to meet debt obligations.

The usual procedure saw all un

friendly bidders silenced, while sympathetic farmers bid a few cents for
each item auctioned.

With the sale completed, the goods were returned to

the farmer being forced to sell.
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This relatively calm action of winter,

however, erupted into startling violence in the spring.
In late March, Plymouth County farmers once again rose to vigorous
action.

On this occasion, farmers occupied the Ed Durband farm at Struble,

north of LeMars.

Durband, behind in his rent payments, faced certain

eviction from his farm.
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On April 16, tensions built over the Durband

^Saloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent In The Middle West,
1900-1939, p. UU8.
75

^LeMars Globe-Post. January 23, 1933. The anti-tuberculin test
episode, the first and only in Plymouth County, was probably a remnant
of an outbreak of farm rebellion in eastern Iowa in 1931, where farmers
in Cedar County resisted mandatory state tuberculin tests. For a complete
discussion,see Frank D. Dileva, "Frantic Farmers Fight Law," Annals of Iowa,
32 (July, 195U): 81-109.
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, February lU, 1933.
^^John L. Shover, "The Penny-Auction Rebellion," The American West, 2
(Fall, 1965): 65-66.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, March 27, 1933.
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case as thirty to forty automobiles were on the farm that morning, respond—
ing to reports that Sheriff Rippey would evict Durband.

The LeMars Globe-

Post reported that a feeling existed that the situation would result in
"shooting it out between the opposing forces."

Recognizing the tense sit70
uation, Rippey backed down in his eviction attempts. ^ A standoff resulted
in the Durband case until the farmers1 rebellion reached the pinnacle of
its violence in late April.
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District Court Judge Charles C. Bradley announced on April 26 , that
he would hear cases objecting to the constitutionality of the debt moraRi
!
torium law.01- Five eastern
insurance companies brought the suit that was
Qp

to be heard on April 2T.

A melee of violence developed on that Thursday

In late April that demonstrated the farmers frustration^ and simultaneously
led to the demise of the local Farm Holiday movement.
O ’Brien County bordered Plymouth on the northeast . On; the morning of
April 27* a foreclosure sale was scheduled at Primghar, the-county seat..
Some 600 to 1000 farmers, many from Plymouth County, assembled to stop the
sale.

The foreclosure was not halted, but violence broke out as farmers

rushed the few deputies present, took their clubs, and forced some to kiss
the American flag.

According to an account of the O ’Brien County-

incident in the Iowa Union Farmer., a group of farmers worked out an

79Ibid., April 16 , 1933.
^°Farm Holiday News. Aprils 1933*

81
LeMars Globe-Post. April 2T, 1933.
82
Omaha Vorld-Herald. April 28, 1933, p. 2.
^^O'Brlen County Bell. May 3, 1933.
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arrangement between creditor and debtor and thus the sale was concluded
outside of court on & compromise basis.®**

While the Modern fT6ers, a

council of O'Brien County farmers who negotiated foreclosure compromises,
met in the courthouse, other farmers heard speeches outside.

It was this

crowd that provoked a fight that resulted in injuries to some of the farm
ers.

Frustrated by the events at Primghar, and suffering a head wound from

the fight, Morris Cope of Plymouth County told the crowd "we111 go to LeMars
and get Judge

Bradley.

By Thursday afternoon the crowd of farmers from Primghar, although
reduced in numbers, entered LeMars.

A rally held at the local ball park

brought forth threats against the owners of the Durband farm north of
town.

When Sheriff Rippey persuaded the group to disperse, many farmers

moved to the courthouse where Judge Bradley was hearing opening arguments
in the case challenging the Iowa moratorium law.

The farmers surged into

the courtroom and insisted that Bradley halt the hearing.

The already

irritated farmers were probably insensed when Bradley ordered them to re
move their hats and proclaimed "this is my courtroom!" and,when the judge
refused to halt the proceedings, some seized him and roughly escorted him
from the courthouse.

They loaded Bradley into a truck, took him to the

outskirts of LeMars, and threatened him with mutilation and hanging un
less he agreed to stop signing mortgage foreclosures. A rope was thrown
over the cross-member of a utility pole and placed around the judge's
neck.

While some farmers tugged at the opposite end of the rope, others

®**Iowa Union Farmer, May 3, 1933.
i
®^0 TBrien County Bell, May 3 and 20, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly
Sentinel, June 9» 1933.
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removed Bradley's trousers.

R. F. Starzl, editor of the LeMars Globe-

Post , followed the farmers to the country crossroads location and observed
that ,rone gathered that this business was distasteful, to them, but they
were impelled* by some grim destiny that they could not resist’. When the
judge at last swore a sort of compromise oath they all seemed relieved
Q/r
that they could retire with credit.’
Controlled somewhat by the pres
ence and wise counsel of Starzl, the mob dispersed and left the Judge
along the roadside.^

The near-lynching of Judge Bradley received national attention.

In

addition to coverage in the New York Times, newspapers as geographically
distributed as the Wichita Beacon» Savannah NewsHartford Courant, and
Cleveland Plain Dealer, carried the s t o r y . D u r i n g the preceding tenmonths, the farmers* movement in northwest Iowa had received considerable
attention, and perhaps flirted with success.

But the wild events of

April 2T, 1933, caused the Holiday movement in Plymouth* County to lose
many of its previous gains. Popular support for reckless and illegal
behavior could not be found.
dent.^

Milo Reno, among others, deplored the inci

The LeMars Globe-Post, previously supportive of the Farmers'

a/?

°LeMars Globe-Post. May 1, 1933; and personal, interview with Leo
De Force, LeMars, Iowa, August 18, 1977. De Force was an eyewitness to
the attempted lynching of Judge Bradley. He waslater called on to testify
in the Iowa National Guard's investigation of the incident.,
^LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933, p. 6 . In testimony delivered at
the trial of two of the Judge's abductors, it was revealed that Starzl.
warned the farmers of the Judge's heart condition and that, it they did not
stop they might have a death on their hands^% e v York Times, April 28, 1933, p. 1; andLiterary Digest, May 13,
1933, p. 8 .
^Sloux City Journal. April 29, 1933.
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Holiday, condemned this direct action phase of the farmers' movement.9^
The official governmental reaction to the attempted lynching was swift
and severe.

Governor Herring proclaimed martial law in Plymouth and

O'Brien Counties on April 28, the day after the incident.

By that after

noon, the first National Guard troops occupied LeMars.9^- Before the two
week martial law rule ended, over one-hundred men, mostly farmers from
Plymouth County, had been arrested.9^

The National Guard’s investigation,

under the direction of Colonel Glen Haynes, lasted for two weeks with the
interrogation of hundreds of witnesses and suspects.

On May 11, Governor

Herring lifted the martial law proclamation.9^
Locally, the two weeks from April 27 to May 11, were disastrous for
the Farmers* Holiday Association.

Even the faithful LeMars Globe-Post

criticized the lawlessness of the recent episode.

oli

By May 11, the

leaders of the county Holiday organization were either Jailed in a wire
encampment at LeMars, or in hi ding. 9^ A defense fund was begun to finance
the expected legal costs of Holiday members, and hopeful plans were dis
cussed to retain Clarence Darrow as the Holiday's attorney.

Darrow indi

cated he was in sympathy with the farmers and said, "I would not say that
they took the best way in their difficulties, but they are desperate in
9°LeMars Globe-Post. May 1, 1933.

91Ibid.
9^New York Times, May 3, 1933, p. 8 .
^ Siotix City Journal, May 11, 1933.
9^LeMars Globe-Post« May 11, 1933.
9^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 12, 1933; and personal interview
with Leo De Force.

their plight."9^

But the famous Chicago, lawyer*a agreement to come to

Iowa to defend the farmers was rendered unnecessary when criminal conspir
acy charges were not pressed, and when it was decided to try the farmers
on assault charges in civilian court.
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Trials hegan on June 9, and cul

minated a month later with the conviction of numerous local farm activists
on various assault charges,

98

. Through the summer months of 1933* with the Bradley incident in the
recent background, the Farmers- Holiday movement in Plymouth County faded.
In October, the 1933 farm strike mustered some support in the county as*
farmers-once again picketed highways.

But whereas a year earlier 1000

pickets could have been assembled in Plymouth. County, the- strike in the
autumn of 1933 was pressed to gather 200 farmers.99
Enthusiasm: for the Farmers * Holiday waned In Plymouth County by the
autumn of 1933.

Perhaps the wild fling with violence In the spring had,

soured farmers on the organization.

More likely, however, was the fact

that some measure of economic relief under the new corn-hog program of
the Roosevelt Administration became available in early Hovember.^®

In

an attempt to control the hog supply, the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis
tration purchased over 6 ,000,000 animals at premium prices in the autumn
^LeMars Globe-Post, May U, 1933; and Farm Holiday Hews, June 23, 1933*
9Tsioux City Journal, May k , 1933; and Hew York Times, May 3, 1933*.
p. 8 ; and May 10, 1933, p. 12.
96LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
99LeMars Globe-Post, October 23, 1933.
lOODiieva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa,11 p. 129-
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of 1 9 3 3 . Furthermore, with the threat of another Farm Holiday in the
autumn of 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration announced plans
to make c o m loans available to farmers on October 2 5 . ^ ^

The editor of

the LeMars Globe-Post, a former Holiday supporter, now admonished Plymouth
County farmers to "grab some of the gravy. "103
Shover discovered two elements in the Farm Holiday movement.

First,

a core of farm organizers with earnest beliefs in the cost-of-production
idea existed.

Second, a spontaneous element of farmers motivated by

desperate economic conditions evolved.

The second group brought notoriety
\

to the Holiday crusade.

But when some measure of economic relief surfaced

in late 1933,the direct action element of the Farmers* Holiday withered.1°**
In Plymouth County, where Dyson maintains "the farm holiday movement
attained its greatest strength,"10^ the events of the farm strike and anti
foreclosure movement gave way to hopes for agricultural improvement under
a new administration.^^

101Murray R. Benedict and Oscar C. Stine, The Agricultural Commodity
Programs, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1956), p. 190.
1(^2Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. Black, Three Years
of The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1937)> PP- 153-51*.
1Q3LeMars Globe-Post, November 16 , 1933.
•^^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, pp. 166-67.
^ 5 p y SOn> "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 78.
^ ^For a survey of farmer attitudes in the autumn of 1933, see the
results of a poll conducted by the Des Moines Register, and reprinted in
Bruce Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," New Republic, November 29 > 1933,
p. 6U.

CHAPTER lit

CONDITIONS OF REBELLION
l
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In Plymouth County, Iowa, farmers protested the economic depression
of the 1930s by picketing the market places, blockading highways, and
stopping foreclosure sales.

At the peak of farm activism, a martial law

declaration covered the county following the near-lynching of a judge.
The agricultural! depression had a nationwide impact, yet probably in no
other county was the farmers* direct action movement so vigorous, or so
extreme.

What, then, were the conditions in this northwest Iowa county

In which such a sharp rebellion occurred in the 1930s?
An investigation into why Plymouth County assumed a prominent role
in the agrarian, rebellion of 1932-33 begins with geography.

The county rs

location just to the north of Sioux City made it strategically important
in any effort by the Farmers* Holiday Association to withhold produce from
the market place.

Because the Big Sioux and Missouri Rivers enclosed the

city on two sides, and there were only seven truck routes leading to Sioux
City, this market center provided an ideal spot* for a blockade demonstra
tion.

Effective action in Plymouth County could shut down three of the-

access roads to Sioux City.^

Since Plymouth County’s border was just:

five miles from this important market , strikers quickly recognized that
blockade action In Plymouth County presented jurisdictional problems for
Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p.- 82.
U3

kb

Sioux City and Woodbury County law enforcement officials.

Picketing at

the county line necessitated the presence of law officers from both counties to insure the passage of trucks to market.
When the Farmers1 Holiday Association
City

2

strike was Joined by the Sioux

Milk Producers* strike in mid-August, 1932, two strike movements

simultaneously focused their attention on the Sioux City market place.
The development of these two separate, but compatible strikes further
augmented Plymouth County’s position as an ideal location for picketers. 3
But other counties bordered Sioux City on the west, south, and east,
and the rebellion in those areas did not equal Plymouth’s response.

Lo

cation would seem then to be only one consideration in provoking extreme
farmer activism in the Sioux City territory.

After all, as pointed out

by John Shover, the Farmers’ Holiday Association was only a loosely orga
nized and directed movement, hence strategic planning and execution were
unlikely.**

Lowell Dyson agrees that the Farm Holiday movement, in its

active phase, was not a highly organized venture.

The highway blockades

around Sioux City, for example, were not highly orchestrated affairs, but
rather were the sudden actions of area farmers.^

One must dig deeper, then,

for the factors that brought on intense direct action and militance by
the farmers of Plymouth County in 1932 and

1933.

2Sioux City Journal., August 16 , 1932, p. 7; and personal interview
with Ralph Rippey, Sioux City, Iowa, September 8, 1977. Rippey was Plym
outh County Sheriff during the early 1930s.
^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p.
**Shover, "The Farmers* Holiday Association Strike," p. 196.
^Dyson, "Farm Holiday Movement," pp. 76-77.
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Bruce Bliven, a native Iowan who covered the farm strike for the New
Republic, pointed out that the extreme activism occurred in some of Iowa*s
most prosperous farm country.

6

The merits of Bliven*s contention can be-

seen in a detailed economic examination of Plymouth County.

Indeed, the

county was not a poor area, and farmers in the county appeared on the sur
face to have been economically more successful, than the average.

Plymouth

County had a population of 2U ,000 in 1930, of which 13,800 were farm res
ident s.7

In terms of area, Plymouth was the fourth largest county In the
o
Hawkeye State.
Located on.the western edge of Iowa, and bordering the
Big Sioux River, the county can be classified as one of gently rolling*
rich farm land.

The exception to this geographical pattern is in the

western one-third of the county where the land, is hilly and: serious erosion makes agriculture a more difficult task.

Q

The relative prosperity of Plymouth County at the beginning of the.
1930s can be demonstrated through an examination of farm size and value.
In 1933, the year of peak violence in the area, the average size, farm in
the county was 190 acres compared to the state average of 160.5 acres.
The relatively larger farms in Plymouth County were no statistical,
^Bliven* "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 6b .
^Lauren K. Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts Basebook of Iowa, Special
Report Number 1, (Ames: Iowa State College, 1936), pp. 16U-65.
Q
H. IT. Whitney, editor, Iowa Official Register, 1929-1930, (Des Moines:
State of Iowa, 1929), p. 202.
^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, map insert.
■^Iowa State Department of Agriculture, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture,
1933, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1933) , pp. 222-25.
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aberration.

In fact, 1*0 percent of the farms in the county exceeded

190 acres.^

At the time of the farm strike, the foreclosure sale stop

pages, and the near-lynching, the county was composed of comparatively
large farms on good farm land.
Farmstead and land values further demonstrate relative prosperity
in Plymouth County.

In 1930, the average value of farm land and buildings

per acre in the county stood at $ll*2.
to the state average of $12U.

This figure compared favorably

The $ll*2 per acre value far outstripped

the averages established in the surrounding states of Minnesota, South.
Dakota, and

N e b r a s k a . ^

While the value of farm land and buildings in

Plymouth County dropped to $82 per acre in 1933, it remained above the
state

average.

^

jn both farm size and value, Plymouth County was cer

tainly not a poor county.
Yet, this county was situated in the area of the state with the high
est tenancy rate during the 1930s.

The nine counties with the highest

tenancy rates were all in the northwest section.
did not rank among the worst.

However, Plymouth County

Its rate of 65.1 percent tenant operated

farms in 1933 ranked twenty-sixth out of the state's 99 counties.

The

counties of Sioux, O'Brien, Cherokee, and Woodbury, all bordering on
13-U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Marketing Service, and
Iowa Department of Agriculture,^Division of Agricultural Statistics, Iowa
Agricultural Statistics. Plymouth County. 19**0, (Des Moines: State of
Iowa, 191*0), p. i*2.
^Thomas J. Pressly and William H. Scofield eds., Farm Reed. Estate
Values in the IMited States by Counties, 1850-1959, (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 19^5), pp. 3^-35.
l^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. llU-15.
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Plymouth, reported higher tenancy rates for that year.

lU

Perhaps farm

tenants in Plymouth County persisted on their rented farms more success
fully than tenants elsewhere.

By 1935* nearly 50 percent of the tenants

in the county had been on the same farm for five years.^

The tenants

endured, despite the fact that rent in the county ranked among the high16
est in the state during the period.
Although the county had a high
rate of tenancy and rent, its predicament was not as dire as her neighbors.
One must be careful here, but the greater tenancy persistence rate in
Plymouth County suggests a significant characteristic in that county's
rebellion.

Perhaps there existed in the county an element of tough farm

ers who refused to give in to the depression.
Despite the harsh economic years, the farmers in Plymouth County
earned relatively good incomes.

For example, gross income per farm in

1930 for the state of Iowa stood at $3,303, while gross income per Plym
outh County farm was $U,215• Thus, gross earnings per farm in the county
were 28 percent higher than the state average, as only eleven other coun
ties reported higher per farm gross earnings.^
Additional proof of comparative economic well-being in Plymouth County
can be seen in an examination of farm conveniences.

If the economic pros

perity of a county can be measured in terms of material goods, Plymouth
County measures up very well.

By 1930, based on the presence of the

^Ibid., pp. 10U-06.
^USDA, Iowa Agricultural Statistics.

Plymouth County, p. Ul.

^Soth, Agricultural Economics Facts, p. 105.
1TIbid., pp. 10-13.
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conveniences of agrarian life, farmers in this county were a generally
prosperous group.

In 1930, 7$ of Iowa's 99 counties ranked lower than

Plymouth in regard to telephones, automobiles, radios, water systems, and
electric, lights. Sixty percent of Plymouth County farm homes had radios ;
83 percent had telephones; 20 percent were electrified; 3k percent were
equipped with indoor plumbing; and 96 percent possessed automobiles.

In

each category, with the exception of electrical, service, the county* ranked
well above state averages.

18

The county's farmers also possessed numerous m odem farm implements.
By 1933, although mired in the agricultural depression, there was one
tractor for every three farms in the county; statewide the ratio was one.
to four.

In the same year, Plymouth County farmers owned one truck for

every nine farms.

IQ
Again, the state ratio was higher at one to eleven. •

This data is instructive; Plymouth County farmersy despite the depression,
were economically more prosperous than many of their fellow farmers.
The preceding data substantiates Bruce Bliven's observation that the
farm rebellion centered in prosperous farming country.

What, then, were

the economic circumstances that moved the relatively prosperous farmersof Plymouth County to revolt?

One answer lies in the sudden agricultural

economic downturn in the early 1930s, and the countyfs particular type o£
agriculture.
Dyson argues that the decade of the 1920s represented a period of .
redirection, for agriculture, not depression.

He suggests that economically

l8ibia., pp. 155-53.
19u SDA, Yearbook of Agriculture. 1933, pp. 222-25.
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the farmers' situation was not desperate in the 1920s,

The agricultural

depression came in the early 1930s when prices for farm commodities took
a sharp down turn. 20
Important economic data supports Dyson's argument.

An index of farm

prices, with the base period 1910-191^ equalling 100, demonstrates the
point.

In 1919-20 prices were extremely high, indexing at 209 and 205

respectively.

Prices sunk in 1921 to an index price of 116, mostly because

adjustments following the war had their greatest impact that year.

The

price index remained relatively stable from 1922 through 1929» ranging
from 12U to lU7.

In 1929 the index of prices stood at 138.

the index fell to 117.
80.

Then, in 1930,

The following year, it retreated even further to

When, in 1932, the index price reached 57, it had achieved its low

point for the depression period.

21

In Iowa, c o m and hog prices for the period verify the above data
and add substance to Dyson's argument.

In 1927, 1928, and 1929, hogs

sold in Iowa for $9*^9, $8.77, and $9.50 per hundred-weight respectively.
During the same years, corn prices fluctuated from seventy-four cents to
eighty-two cents per bushel.

However, by 1932, hogs had lost two-thirds

of their value and sold for $3.37.

In similar fashion,the price paid for

corn had declined to twenty-five cents.22
on

Dyson, "Farm Holiday Movement," p. 11; and Dyson, "Was Agricultural
Distress In The 1930s A Result of Land Speculation During World War I?
The Case of Iowa," pp. 577-8U.
2-*-Forster

and Weldon, "The Agricultural Problem," p. 3 6 2 .

22A. G. Black, "The Crisis In The Fall of 1932," The Agricultural
Emergency In Iowa, (Ames: Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State
College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, 1933), p. 2.
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Surveys conducted by the Iowa Department of Agriculture from 1930
through 1932 revealed the impact of this rapid and sharp price decline*
In 1929 s Iowa farms showed an average net income of $277^ • The following
year , the average net income dropped to $763.

By 1931 a similar survey

indicated that average net income was ”$8l8 in the red*."^

As Dyson

suggests, the severity of the agricultural depression, and thus the anguish
of the farmer, was most pronounced from 1930 to 1933.
Were Plymouth County to be characterized agriculturally in the 1930s,
it would have been as a corn and hog producing economy;

Corn had long

been, "king" in the county.. As early as the pre-World War- I years,, the county
had led the- state of Iowa in c o m production even though three other counties contained more c o m acreage.

In, 1932*, Plymouth County could, claim

that 20 of its 2k townships had Uo to 50 percent of their total acreage in
corn.

Although other crops were raised, the county was principally a com,

producer.2-*
Evidence suggests that the long years of corn-dominated agriculture
had taken-their toll on Plymouth County’s major crop*

In 1928, the county

was the fifth greatest producer of c o m in Iowa, and for both 1929 and 1930,
the county ranked fourth in total c o m production.

However , it is note

worthy that the county's yield per acre in each of those years was below
23USDA, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1931, p. 7.
2V . s. Freeman, History of Plymouth County Iowa: Her People. Industries.
and Institutions * Volume I. (Indianapolis: B. F. Bowen and Company, Incorporat—
ed. i9TTTrF.~3T.
25goth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. lUl.

the state average, and that of northwest Iowa.
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Even though the price

paid for corn ranged in the respectable area of seventy-four to eightytwo cents per bushel in those years, low c o m yields pushed the county's
farmers toward hard times.2^

The crop season of 1931 brought economic

disaster to the corn-dominated county.

By autumn of that year, c o m

prices had plummeted to thirty-eight cents per bushel.

oA

For the c o m

farmers of the county, the real distress in that year was the combina
tion of seriously declining prices and low production.

Because of drought,

total corn production for the county ranked only fifty-third out of Iowa's
ninety-nine counties.
the state.2^

The yield per acre represented the second lowest in

During 1932 and 1933, c o m production resumed more normal

levels for Plymouth County, but its yield per acre remained low and prices
paid for c o m reached disparaging levels.

The major county newspaper

reported c o m prices ranging from a high of forty-four cents per bushel in
early 1932, to a low of twelve cents in the middle of the anti-foreclosure
31
movement of 1933*
Plymouth County farmers combined major hog raising efforts with their
c o m production.

Hogs had long been the primary form of livestock produced

United States Department of Agriculture Marketing Service, Cooperating
with Iowa Department of Agriculture, Division of Agricultural Statistics,
Iowa Corn, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 19Uo), pp. 2-5.

2^Black, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, p. 2.
28
Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 33.
29
USDA, Iowa Com, pp. U-5.
^Ibid. p p . 6-7 .
■^LeMara Globe-Post.,January 11, 1932, and February 27, 1933.
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in the county.32

By 1932-33, this northwest Iowa county ranked seventh

in the state in hog production.

In fact, most of the leading hog produc

ing counties in the state surrounded Plymouth.33

For this hog raising

area,prices were respectable throughout the 1920s.

Using 1910-191^ as

the base period with an index price of 100, market conditions were favor
able to hog producers by the late twenties.

From 1927 to 1929, the

index price for hogs ranged from llO to lU7.^

However, beginning in

1930,market conditions soured for pork producers.
hogs in January, 1930, stood at 97.

The index price for

With minor fluctuations, the price

dropped steadily until it attained its low point of 33 in December, 1932,
and January, 1933.35

From 1931 until early 1933, corn and hog prices

declined markedly for farmers.

It was at the low point in market prices

for these commodities that agrarian unrest among the corn end hog pro
ducers of Plymouth County peaked.
In order to fully appreciate what had happened to corn end hog prices
in the early 1930s, an understanding must be gained as to the relationship
between c o m and hogs.

The problem was complex as attested by Secretary

of Agriculture Henry A., Wallace who foresaw no solution in attempting to
formulate relief in this area in 1933.

The economic problems of c o m

and hogs cannot be dealt with as independent commodities.
3^USDA, lova Agricultural Statistics;

Since c o m is

Plymouth County, p. 3^.

-^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 38-39.
3U
Black, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, p. 2.
35soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 22.
^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 1U2-U3.
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used primarily as feed in producing livestock, it is in the form of live
stock that corn goes to market.
Agricultural economists in the 1920s and 1930s recognized a classic
supply-and-demand relationship "between hog production and corn prices.
Since corn was chiefly used as livestock feed, increases in supply, and
consequently reductions in the price of corn, created pressure for increas
ed livestock production.

Basically, farmers fed cheaply priced corn to

livestock in an effort to make a profit from corn-fattened livestock sales.
Reductions in corn supply, and subsequent increases in price, caused an
opposite reaction by livestock p r o d u c e r s . As a corn and hog producing
county, Plymouth felt the impact of the above market workings.
In the years during and immediately after World War I , a serious food
crisis existed in Europe.

Enlargement of dairy herds and beef cattle

raised for slaughter would have taken two to three years to achieve a
finished food product.

Under the pressure of this war-time demand, em

phasis fell upon hog production which could provide a finished product
in less than one year.3^

During and immediately following the war,

United States exports of pork grew dramatically.
the pork produced in America was exported.
States boomed.

By 1919* 2k percent of

Hog production in the United

By the middle 1920s pork exports resumed a more normal

level of 6 percent as production also leveled.^

Throughout the post-war
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D. A. Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, (Washington, D. C.:
The Institute of Economics of The Brookings Institution, 1935), p. 1.
3®Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of The AAA, p. 302.
39James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923, (Berkeley:
of California Press, 1957), p. l6.
Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, p. 11.
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decade, corn acreage and production remained steady, causing normal, an
ticipated market conditions for corn and hogs.**1

By the late 1920s, these

conditions began to change and the result created despair for c o m and hog
farmers.
Beginning in 1928, a series of events set in motion a drastic decline
in the c o m and hog markets.

In that year, the price of hogs dropped

seventy-two cents per hundred-weight from the preceding year’s price of
$9.^9.^

According to one agricultural economist, four factors— consumer

spending, cost of processing, supply, and discrepancies in hog producers*
income and expenditures— contributed to this mild price decline.

It was

calculated that because of the depressed market conditions 100 pounds of
pork in 1928 bought only 71 percent of what it bought in the 1910 to 191^
p e r i o d . T h e weakened pork market provided a harsh economic blow to Iowa
farmers for whom hog sales represented 38 to U3 percent of total income in
the 1928 to 1930 period.^

Hopeful hog farmers attempted to produce their

way out of the mild price decline of 1928.

Representative of this ten

dency was the record number of hogs marketed in Plymouth County in 1929
and 1930.^5
The integral relationship between c o m and hog production demonstrated
its impact from 1931 to 1933.

The general steady trend in c o m production

^Benedict and Stine, Agricultural Commodity Programs, p. I87.
Up

Black, Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 2.

^Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, pp. 16-20.
UU
USDA, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1930, p. 51.
^USDA, Iowa Agricultural Statistics:

Plymouth County, p. 3h0
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during the post-war decade broke in 1931 with increased acreage and total
production reported.
nationally.^

The following year, record corn production resulted

In the autumn of that year, the Agricultural College at

Ames, announced with little enthusiasm that, "the State of Iowa is harvestj.7
ing the largest corn crop in her history." 1 In the glutted market place,
corn prices dropped to twenty cents per bushel which was only one-fourth
the 1928-29 price.

U8

Because of the large supply of cheap c o m in 1932-

33, hog production expanded.

Increased production of pork occurred even

though hog prices were extremely

low.

**9

Problems in the export market caused further shrinkage in pork demand
and thus price.

In 1932, Great Britain, the largest importer of United

States pork,established import quotas on the product.

The following year,

Germany instituted higher tariffs on American pork, which further restricted
demand.^

Studying this situation, Shover concluded that "corn-hog farmers

picketed highways at a time when their foreign market was at an unprece
dented l o w . "51

By December, 1932, the winter of the rebellion, hogs com-

manded only one-third of the price paid two years earlier.

52

In c o m and

hog producing Plymouth County, farmers then resorted to direct action.

^Benedict and Stine, Agricultural Commodity Programs, pp. 187-88.

h7
'Black, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, p. 1.
**8rbid., p. 2.
^Benedict and Stine, Agricultural Commodity Programs, pp. 196-97.
^Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, p. 13.
51shover, Corabelt Rebellion, p. 11.
5^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 22.
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Compounding the misfortune of declining agricultural prices in the
early 1930s

the more serious problem of the farmers * struggle to hold

on to their land.

The land represented the farmers* livelihood.

If taxes

were not paid, or mortgage payments not met, farmers risked the loss of
their land.

Because of the agricultural depression in the 1930s * farmers

faced the even worse dilemma of foreclosed land not selling for the mort
gage price.

In such cases, livestock, machinery, and even household

possessions were sold to amke up the deficiency.

A small town Iowa law

yer commented that witnessing such bankruptcy proceedings, which too often
left farmers with nothing to show for many years of hard work, were, "the
53
most discouraging, disheartening experiences of my legal life." ^

In

Iowa, and especially in Plymouth County, the threat of this dismal process
reached its zenith from 1931 to 1933*
Farmers themselves had helped create the disastrous foreclosure sit
uation of the 1930s. From 1910 to 1920, speculation in agricultural lands
caused farm values to rise sharply.

Nationally, average values of farm

land and buildings increased by 110 percent.
percent for the same period.

In Iowa, values rose by 135

Plymouth County experienced an extraordinarily

sharp increase as average values rose by 15? percent.
declined gradually during the 1920s.
ably exceeded those of 1910.

Values at all levels

However, 1930 values still consider-

The consequence of the escalated land

values, especially during the war years, was a large debt incurred by the
purchasers.

As prices tapered off in the 1920s, and plummeted in the 1930s,

53Beml ey J. Glass, "Gentlemen, The C o m Belt!" Harper*s, July, 1933»
pp. 2 0 5 -0 6 .
■^Pressly and Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values, pp. 3^-35•
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many farmers were left owing large debts incurred in good times.
mortgage debt picture of 1930 is revealing.
stood at $3561.

The

Nationally, the debt per farm

For Iowa, which had the highest state average debt, indebt

edness reached $9626 per farm.. At the same time, the mortgage debt per
farm in Plymouth County rose to a staggering $11,926, ranking among the
highest in Iowa.55

As land values tumbled during the depression* desperate

farmers feared the impossibility of liquidating their debt burden.

Plymouth

County land values dropped from a 1930 average of $26,700 per farm to
$15,000 In 1935*

Only four counties in Iowa suffered greater property value

losses during the same period.^
In addition to mortgage indebtedness, made worse by declining farm
values* farmers faced the oppressive burden of other fixed costs.
the most burdensome fixed costs were real estate taxes.

Among

It has been cal

culated that, a farmer producing an average crop in 1915 could have paid his
taxes with income from a little more than three acres of crop.
1932, taxes had doubled and prices slumped dramatically.

However, by

In that year, it

would have taken the same corn farmer income from twenty-eight acres of
crop to meet his tax obligation.57

Based on the assessed value of property,

these taxes hit hardest in areas of high property values.

At a time when

cash income was in short supply, Plymouth County farmers faced an average
^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 109 and 117.
^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United
States Census of Agriculture, 1935: Statistics by Counties, (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 236-^5.
5Tpyaon, "Farm Holiday Movement,” pp. 15-16.
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tax burden of $2*»0.^

The typical county farm was valued at 25 percent

more than the state average in 1930.

And in January, 1933, the value of

farm land in the county was the second highest in the state.

Only

Pottawattomie County exceeded Plymouth in taxable value that year.

59

Not

coincidentally, these were counties of vigorous activity during the farm
rebellion.
Shover contends that the farm debt situation took on crisis propor
tions following the stock market crash of 1929 1

"The farmers* debt posi

tion was vulnerable and when investors and bank account creditors were
forced to make calls upon their assets, investment institutions in turn
had to press demands upon their farm d e b t o r s . T h e chief institution
that supplied short-term credit to the farmer was the country bank.^
The great decline in farm income and land values in the early 1930s under
mined the financial stability of these banks.

Bank operations had been

suspended and closed during the post-war decade, but the problem became
alarming in the early thirties.

Iowa ranked as a leader in bank closings.

The previous record for bank failures in the state had been established in
1926.

However, the 208 banks that failed in 1931 more than doubled the

1926 figure.

62

Plymouth County experienced an almost total failure of its

^LeMars Globe-Post, August 1, 1932.
^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 118-29.
^°Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 16 .
^U.S. Congress, House, The Farm Debt Problem, 73rd Congress, 1st
Session, House Document No. 9, Letter from Secretary of Agriculture, March
27, 1933, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 29.
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Black, Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 3.
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banking system in July, 1932.

Virtually every bank in the county closed.

Not only did the banks temporarily suspend operations, but they also forced
depositors to sign waivers that obligated them to observe a moratorium on
withdrawals. According to the waiver, depositors agreed that withdrawals
over the ensuing five years could be made only at the discretion of the
bank.

The ultimate frustration for Plymouth County depositors in this

predicament resulted when the banks declared that they would not reopen
until all depositors had signed the waivers*

63

The economically depressed farmer, too often left owing delinquent
taxes and at the mercy of unstable local banking, also faced the threat of
foreclosure on his farm mortgage.

In 1925 less than twenty-five farms per

thousand were foreclosed in Iowa.

By 1932 the figure had doubled, and in

1933 Iowa led the nation with seventy-eight foreclosures per thousand farms.
The 6k00 farms foreclosed in Iowa in 1932 represented three percent of all
the farms in the state.^

This total number of foreclosures in Iowars 99

counties equalled an average of slightly more than 63 per county in 1932.
Shover concludes that "direct action was most vigorous in the attempt
to halt forced sales; these actions occurred when foreclosures were high
est in number . . . and in the area where they were most frequent."^

But

Plymouth County, where direct action was most pronounced, suffered only
seventeen foreclosures in 1932.

Shover*s conclusion should not be dis

carded, but in the case of Plymouth County requires refinement*
^LeMars Globe-Post. July 11 and lH, 1932.
6U

Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 115-20.

^shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. IT.

Of the

60

seventeen foreclosures in the county in 1932, eight took place in November
and December.
closures.^

In the first month of 1933,there were five more farm fore
Four other foreclosure sales in January were also halted by

6t
farmer direct action. 1 The county’s major newspaper had warned in late
December, that unless relief came to the area there would be an "avalanche
of foreclosures."

68

At the end of 1932, when the number of foreclosures

per county in the state averaged sixty-three annually, and five monthly,
Plymouth County neared the average.

Had it not been for halted foreclosure

sales in January, 1933, the county probably would have exceeded the state
average.
The prospects for a worsened foreclosure picture in the winter and
spring of 1933 surfaced when the Iowa State Agricultural College reported
that the state would "harvest the biggest crop of mortgage foreclosures
it has ever k n o w n . A t the precise moment when foreclosures in Plymouth
County reached their peak, so also did the local farmers * direct action
to protect themselves.

The threat of foreclosure as much as the actual

event provoked Plymouth County farmers to extreme.action.
In the early 1920s, private investors, local banks, and mortgage
companies were responsible for most of the foreclosures on farm mortgages.
After 1926, however, a new group of mortgage holders emerged in importance.
Institutional investors including insurance companies and large banks made
66
Plymouth County Land and Deed Record, Book Number 30, (LeMars, Iowa),
pp. 7-29.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 2, 5, 9> and 2 6 , 1933.
^ Ibid., December 26, 1932.
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Black, Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 1.
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up this nev group.

In 1925, institutional investors were involved in only

IT percent of all foreclosures.

By 1932,that figure had soared to 73 per

cent.^®
Corporations held minimal amounts of farm acreage prior to 1929.
However, hy September, 1933, insurance companies, non-local banks, and
large real estate concerns had acquired about 8 percent of the state*s
farm land.

Corporate investment continued to rise during the depression

and, by 1937, these institutional investors claimed 11.2 percent of all
farm land in the Hawkeye State.73-

Corporate investment in Plymouth County

during the period underwent significant changes.

While the state record

ed 8 percent corporate held land in 1933, Plymouth reported only 5 percent
business-controlled land.

However, whereas the amount of corporate-owned

land statewide grew to 10 percent by 1935, Plymouth corporate-owned land
grew to 7 percent .72

Farm militancy in the county came at the same time

corporate interests were expanding rapidly.

Desperate farmers fought not

only to save their farms, but also against these unwanted outside influ
ences .73
As Map 3 on the following page indicates, in 1933, the year of anti
foreclosure uprising, corporate investments were concentrated in the southern

7°William G. Murray and Ronald C. Bentley, "Farm Mortgage Foreclosures,"
The Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, (Ames: Collegiate Press, Incorporated,
March, 1933) , p. 77.
7^-William G. Murray and H. W. Bitting, Corporate-Owned Land in Iowa,
1937, Bulletin 362. (Ames: Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State
College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, 1937), p. 95.
?2Ibid., pp. 12^-25.
73see Chapter IV.
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and western townships of the county.

By 193*+* two townships in the

southwestern corner of the county consisted of twenty percent or more
corporate-controlled farm land.
land in the county existed.
overvalued.

It was' in this section that the poorest

In good times, the land had been drastically

When severe weather and economic conditions developed, the

overpriced poor land quickly lost its value.

As the price of this land

declined, corporations bought it in substantial amounts.

75

Corporations held 15 to 19 percent of the farm land in the central
and southern townships of Plymouth and Elkhorn.

Perry, Westfield, Johnson,

Liberty, and Hungerford townships reported corporate owned farm land at
less than 15 percent, but in excess of both county and state averages for
193^.*^

With the exception of Westfield, all of the above townships were

in the southern portion of the county.

The evidence suggests a concentra

tion of corporate investment in a restricted area of the county.

As will

be seen later, this area of the county may have contained the most farmer
activists.

In a period that experienced increased tenancy rates, dis

gruntled farmers found a scapegoat in the corporate absentee landlords.
Organized farmers struck out at this threat to their accustomed way of
life.

It should have come as no surprise that the holder of the mortgage

at Plymouth County’s first foreclosure sale stoppage in January, 1933, was
the New York Life Insurance Company. ^

^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, 193^, (Sioux City:
Western Map Company, 193^), pp. 1-25.
^Murray, "Prosperity and Land Boom, 1901-1920," p. U7 8 .
^^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 109.
^ LeMars Globe-Post . January 5, 1933.
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The preceding discussion of the agricultural depression of 1930 to
1933 demonstrated the economic conditions that moved some American farmers
to protest.

In some instances, Plymouth County’s agricultural situation

was not as unfortunate as others.

On the other hand, this relatively

prosperous northwest Iowa county had developed certain expectations that
were thwarted hy the hard, years of declining prices and diminished land
values.

In fact, the very land upon which the farmer depended for his

livelihood lay threatened.

Heaped on all the previous discouraging

economic news for Plymouth County farmers, a chain of agriculturally ca
lamitous events in 1931 and 1932 struck the county.
In 1931, the state of Iowa experienced slightly above normal rainfall.
One exception to this general precipitation pattern existed in northwest
Iowa, in an area including Cherokee, Plymouth* and Woodbury Counties, where
rainfall shortages were reported ranging from six to eight inches.^®

The

impact on the corn crop was disastrous as Plymouth County’s total produc
tion was halved, and yield per acre ranked second lowest in the state.
In terms of corn production and yield, the 1931 drought hit Plymouth County
the h a r d e s t . B y February, 1932, the LeMars Globe-Post announced that the
county had been designated a drought area by the Secretary of Agriculture,
and printed procedures by which farmers could apply for government seed
and feed loans.

8o

Of the several designated drought counties in the state,

Plymouth led in the number of federally granted seed and feed loans, re
questing a total of 202 loans*

Unfortunately, however, in too many

78

Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. 6.

^USDA, Iowa Corn, p. U.
Q^LeMars Globe-Post, February 18 and 22, 1932.
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instances already deeply indebted farmers found themselves strapped with
additional financial burdens.
The local drought persisted through 1932, with a particularly dry
Op

June and early July seriously effecting the corn crop in the county.^

A

break in Plymouth County’s long drought came on July 6, 1932, but it did
so under the most unfortunate circumstances for the corn producing county.
General rains blanketed the county that day.

However, in the greatest

corn producing sector of the county, severe hail totally ruined what re
mained of the drought beleaguered corn crop.88

Piled on man-made economic

problems, nature had been cruel to Plymouth County in the months immedi
ately preceding the outbreak of the farmers’ rebellion.
Only four days after the drought had subsided, and the hail had de
stroyed the corn crop in southeastern Plymouth County, came equally dis
couraging news of local bank failure.

On July 10, the four LeMars banks

closed and smaller banks around the county also declared holidays.
The local reaction to the bank holidays did not go unnoticed.

Rh

Donald

Murphy, reporting on the Farm Holiday strike a month later, noted that "it
is not entirely an accident that the area in which the Farmers* Holiday
is strongest is roughly the same area of recent bank holidays."85
Within a month of this series of economic setbacks, Plymouth County
farmers, along with others, had declared their own "holiday" and blockaded

8^Ibid., December 29, 1932.
82Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 6.
88LeMars Globe-Post, July 7, 1932.
8UIbid., July 11, 1932.
85Murphy, "Farmers Go On Strike," p. 6 7 .
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the highways of northwest Iowa.

The discouraging events immediately pre

ceding the farm revolt could not, in themselves, have caused the intense
farmer activism practised in Plymouth County from August, 1932, until
April, 1933.

Other factors, including the strength of the local organi

zation and the personalities involved, remain to be examined.

However,

coupled with the general decline in agricultural prices, and supported by
the rising fear of farm foreclosures, the events Just preceding the farm
ers' strike in Plymouth County provided immediate provocation for this
important agrarian uprising.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORGANIZATION OF REBELLION
The Fanners* Holiday Association strike of 1932, and subsequent direct
action in the ensuing year, was not a highly disciplined and organized ef
fort,

In his study of the farm revolt, John Shover argues "that the

strength of the movement was a tempestuous and little organized force
whose allegiance to the Holiday Association was tangential,"^

Initially

the Plymouth County Holiday Association showed signs of a viable formal
leadership.

However, as the farm revolt progressed through the- autumn and

winter of 1932-33, an unofficial element in the local farmers* movement
replaced this formal leadership.

Examination of the origins and eventual

collapse of the Plymouth County Farmers* Holiday Association reveals much
about the restless and independent nature of the farmers* uprising of 1932—
33.
Historically, the Sioux City territory had been the center of activist,
farm and labor organizations in Iowa.

In 1932-33, Iowa farmers over fifty

years of age could remember previous rural insurgency.

The Populist move

ment of the 1890s had found its greatest strength in northwestern Iowa.
Just to the south of Sioux City, in 1 8 9 6 , angry farmers prevented an evie—
tion by a county sheriff.

p

Labor radicalism also surfaced in the Sioux

^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 57.
^Nixon, "The Economic Basis of The Populist Movement In Iowa," pp.
380-82 and 39^.
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City area in 191*+ and 1915.

An army of transient farm workers, organized

by the Industrial Workers of the World, held large rallies and demonstra
tions.

3

According to Everett Luoma, Sioux City became a "wobblies paradise"

under the mayoral administration of Wallace Short.^

One reporter of the

1930s rural rebellion felt the World War I labor agitation had left its
mark on the

area.5

It was with this heritage of activist organization that

Plymouth County farmers forged their Farmers' Holiday Association in 1932.
In the first in-depth' study of the Farmers* Holiday movement, Julius
Korgan contended that the Farmers' Union and the Farmers' Holiday Associa£
tion functioned as separate organizations.
Despite this technical separa
tion, however, the Holiday Association relied heavily on the sympathy of
the Farmers' Union.

And, in some areas, the established Union organization

machinery was utilized as the organizational base of the Holiday.^

It was

not unusual to find farmers who served as officers in, and supported both
Q
organizations.
Glen Miller, president of the Iowa Farmers' Union, an
nounced early in the movement "that the Farmers* Union is sponsoring this
'Holiday' movement."^

At the local level, C. J. Schultz served as president

^Federal Writers' Project, Iowa:

A Guide To The Hawkeye State, p. 3C&.

^Everett E. Luoma, The Farmer Takes A Holiday, (New York:
Press, 1967), p. 13.
^Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 6U.
^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 18.
^Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 78.
Q
Morgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 31.
9lowa Union Fanner, March 9> 1932.
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of the Plymouth County Holiday Association, and was on the Farmers* Union
Board of Directors.1^

In Plymouth County, the mingling of the Farmers*

Union and the Holiday was evident from mid-1932, but? Union importance
dwindled and disappeared as the local Holiday Association took form.
On January 8, 1932, C. J. Schultz was elected president of the Plym
outh County Farmers* Union*

At the same meeting, local members resolved

to commend Schultz, Milo Reno, and other leaders who spoke for the better
ment of their organization.13- By early February, Schultz was moving
through the county bolstering the Union’s organization.12

The first local

mention of a Farmers* Holiday came in a discussion by Schultz at a town
ship Farmers* Union meeting on April 1, 1932.^

Later, on May 23, the

LeMars Globe-Post carried an invitation from the local Farmers* Union
which encouraged farmers to attend a county-wide meeting for an explana
tion of the Holiday.1** The May invitation was the last local press report
on the Farmers* Union for the duration of the Holiday movement.

By June,

at least in press coverage, the Farmers* Holiday was in ascendance in Plym
outh County as mention of the Union disappeared.

The two local organiza

tions apparently operated as one, with only the Holiday group receiving
public attention.

It is noteworthy that C. J. Schultz, the county presi

dent of the Union, also had the official title of president of the county’s
^ I b i d . , September 21, 1932.
11

LeMars Globe-Post, January 11, 1932.,

12Ibid., February U, 1932.
13Ibid., April k % 1932.
lUIbid., May 23, 1932.

TO

Farmers* Holiday Association.

Exactly when the designation as chief of

the Holiday group occurred is uncertain.

What is certain is that by Au

gust, the press recognized Schultz as the local Holiday head.^

Yet

another example of the close relationship of the two local organizations
was demonstrated when the Holiday organizers utilized a.Farmers* Union
meeting to enhance their petition drive for the projected withholding
movement.^
Throughout the summer, the Farmers* Holiday Association gained organi
zational strength.

State Holiday leaders made numerous visits to Plymouth

County organizational meetings.^7

The usual procedure at these meetings

included a speech on the Holiday idea and the passing of petitions seek
ing signatures in support of the withholding movement.

Official member

ship in the Farmers* Holiday Association was solicited at & cost of
-jQ

$1.00.

Reporter Donald Murphy noted that "the area around Sioux City

has a good many Farmers* Union members and many more supporters of the
Farmers* Holiday."^

Membership statistics support Murphy*s observation.

Plymouth County had six Farmers* Union locals and 272 members in March,
1932.

By March, 1933, the number of locals had risen to nine and total

membership reached 322.
in terms of new members.

The county ranked fourth in the state for 1932
In the first three months of 1933, at the

^ I b i d ., August 18, 1932.

l6rbld., July 5, 1932.
^ S e e Chapter II, p. 23.
1 fl

Personal interview with Henry Erichsen, Plymouth County Farmers*
Holiday Association member in the 1930s, Remsen, Iowa, August 18, 1977.
1^Murphy, ’*The Farmers Go On Strike,'* p. 6 7 .
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height of the anti-foreclosure movement, the county claimed 29 new mem
bers. ^

Indeed, membership in the Farmers' Union seemingly surged in Plym

outh County at the same time that the Holiday was active.

Since the organi

zations virtually operated as one, the numbers indicate that the Farmers'
Holiday succeeded in attracting considerable Plymouth County support.
The strength of the Holiday organizational effort in Plymouth County
lay in the eastern and southern townships.

The LeMars Globe-Post gave

regular press attention to the Holiday movement.

From April through July,

1932, the newspaper reported on twelve Holiday organizational meetings.
Map U depicts the township distribution of those meetings.
townships each held one meeting.

Grant and America

The remaining ten organizational meetings

took place in the eastern and southern townships of the county.21

As re

ported by the Iowa Union Farmer , seven of the nine local Farmers1 Union
organizations existed in the southern and eastern section of the county.

op

The concentration of the farmers' movement in that portion of the county
did not go unrecognized by the Globe-Post, which noted that farmers "in that:
part of the county are quietly forming the nucleus of a county-wide move
ment. "^3

it was precisely this area of the county that had suffered seri

ous drought, heavy hail damages in early July, and numerous bank closings
in mid-July.

^ I o w a Union Farmer, March 9 r 1932, January 25» March 22, and April 19*
1933.
^LeMars Globe-Post. April through July, 1932.
22Iowa Union Farmer. March 22, 1933.
2^LeMara Globe-Post» July 21, 1932.
2^Ibid., July T, l1*, 18, and 21, 1932.
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Although the early months of the Holiday movement in Plymouth County
showed encouraging signs of attendance and interest, internal organizational
weakness was apparent from the outset.

For example, the exact plans and

methods of the Holiday remained unclear.

In early May, 1932* the LeMars

Globe-Post, in response to a letter critical of the newspaper’s coverage of
the Holiday, claimed uncertainty as to what the movement entailed.
ignorance was understandable.

25

Such

At a Holiday meeting on June 22, in LeMars,

Bob Moore, secretary of the Iowa Farmers* Union, announced that "the
farmers * holiday movement is spontaneous.

It is so spontaneous that we

have not even prepared sill our plans. . . . You are going to be asked to
share in the planning."

26

This comment suggests that the leaders did not

have an overall plan for the Holiday at this point.
One indication of the lack of centralized control of the Holiday move
ment surfaced at the start of the strike.

Shover found that the strike in

the vicinity of Sioux City
was a different movement from that planned by the leaders of the
Farmers* Holiday Association. In all the preceding buildup there
had been no mention of picketing. Yet at the very Inception of
the withholding movement farmers in Plymouth and Woodbury counties
patrolled highways and threatened non-cooperating farmers. 27
Korgan suggests that the early violence around Sioux City was caused by the
separate dairy farmers* movement.

28

The first report of direct action

against property occurred in Plymouth County when two farmers poured 300

2 5Ibid., May 12, 1932.
26 Ibid., June 23, 1932.
2 ^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 4l.

00
Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 40.
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pounds of cream from a Cherokee Creamery truck onto the ground on August
12.

29

On the night of August 14, the first picketing arose with estimates

that 1000 to 1500 farmers guarded the roads of Plymouth County.

30

Around

Sioux City, eight or nine picket camps were established on major truck
31

routes.
ered.

At these camps anywhere from a handful to 300 farmers were gath

Pickets huddled around camp fires and were usually notified by tele

phone and messenger; about trucks headed in their direction.

When trucks

approached, the pickets, armed with clubs and bricks, blocked the roads, a
committee man would explain their cause, and they usually held firm against
allowing passage of produce.

32

In Kingsley, in southeastern Plymouth County,

the Holiday broadened its activity when representatives of the farmers used
the threat of boycott to persuade produce houses and stores not to buy
33
dairy goods during the Holiday. ^
By the end of the first week of the strike, a crowd of 150 farmers
near LeMars had reached an agreement with J. C. Gillespie, president of the
29
30

Sioux City Journal» August 13, 1932.

LeMars Globe-Post, August 15* 1932.

^ Iowa Union Farmer, August 24, 1932.
^^Herbst, "Feet In The Grass Roots," pp. 47-48 j and Mary Heaton
Vorse, "Rebellion In The Combelt," Harper *s , December, 1932, p. 5« In
blocking market places by stopping vehicles, the Holiday farmers were employ
ing tactics that were at least as old as eighteenth century rural protests
in England. Like their historical counterparts, these crowds sought to
satisfy "immediate and particular grievances." The 1930s picketers sought
to drive up depressed prices by restricting the supply of goods in the market
place. Similar to the activist rural crowds in eighteenth and nineteenth
century England and France, these farmers were reformers rather than
revolutionaries. See Rude, The Crowd In History, p. 30? George Rude, The
Crowd In The French Revolution, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959)*
pp. 232-33? an<i Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, pp. 5-6.
•^LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
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Chamber of Commerce, and local businessmen, not to buy produce during the
Holiday.

In a press release, Milo Reno praised the Plymouth County organi

zation for its work in attempting to include merchants in the movement, and
urged other locals to employ similar tactics.

The local organization had

taken actions which broadened the Holiday effort, and impressed the national
leadership.
Yet even in Plymouth County, the degree of organizational control
during the August strike seemed marginal.

The LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel

pointed out that officials had problems dealing with the strike because
"it is difficult to find anyone whose authority is respected by other
strikers." 35

The pro-Holiday Globe-Post echoed similar sentiments, when

it reported that the local Wells dairy, seeking to cooperate in the strike,
"experienced difficulty in getting proposals acted upon, for there seems to
be no way of being sure just what has authority among the strikers."
Furthermore, once the milk strike ended, an agreement between the Farmers'
Holiday Association and LeMars produce houses permitted eggs, butter,
cream and milk to move into the town.

Despite the agreement, many farmers

independently continued to stop the flow of dairy products into the
county seat.

But the number not abiding by the agreement was small and

they were chastised by the LeMars Globe-Post for giving "their cause a
black eye."3^

^ Ibid., August 15 and 18, 1932.
3^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, August 19» 1932.

^ LeMars Globe-Post, August 22, 1932.
37Ibid., August 29, 1932.

?6

By the end of August, even local control of the striking farmers vas "be
ginning to deteriorate.
I. W. Reck, Plymouth County dairy farmer and leader of the milk
producers, announced the signing of an agreement and an end to the milk
strike on August 2 6 .

Farmers, buoyed by the success of the milk producers,

intensified picketing in Plymouth County in an attempt to prohibit all
produce from reaching

L e M a r s .

As a result of the tight blockade of

LeMars, many non-cooperating farmers shipped their produce to Cherokee in
the next county, thirty miles east of LeMars.

Plymouth County Holiday

members led by Morris Cope, but without the sanction of county leaders,
then attempted to organize farmers around Cherokee in order to blockade
that market place from uncooperative farmers,39

Qn August 30, at an orga

nizational. rally on the Cherokee-Plymouth County line, violence broke out,
as an automobile drove past

and shots were fired at the Holiday organizers.**®

A sixteen year old Kingsley farm youth attending the Holiday meeting received
serious wounds in the incident.
Two days following the Cherokee violence, Reno and John Chalmers, chair
man of the Iowa Farmers* Holiday Association, issued a call for cessation of
the Farm Holiday activities until a governors* conference scheduled to meet
in Sioux City on September 9, had convened.

But the same day the order was

issued, pickets were increased at the Plymouth-Woodbury County line.

38sioux City Journal, August 27, 1932.
^ Ibid., September 1, 1932, p . 5 .
**®Erichsen, personal interview.
**^Sloux City Journal, September 1, 1932, p. 5*

A
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Sioux City Journal reporter wrote that Plymouth County farmers, embitter
ed by the Cherokee incident, "still had their grievances."*42

In fact,

the most intense picketing of the farm strike occurred after the cessa
tion order.

On September 5, four truckers were injured as they attempted

to cross the picket line north of Sioux City, in Plymouth County.^3

Two

days later, an estimated 1000 pickets massed at the county line town of
James and stopped a convoy of twenty-five trucks organized by the Plymouth
County Sheriff and bound for Sioux City from LeMars.
fifty deputies escorted the trucks.

Sheriff Rippey and

The strikers successfully turned back

the convoy after some violence and many threats to the law officers.

In

the confrontation, several trucks were damaged and many of the escorting
deputies had their badges forcibly removed.*4*4 Despite the national and
state organizations' call for a halt in the withholding movement, the"
Sioux City Journal reported on September 8 , that "no livestock arrived at
the yards from Plymouth County today."*45

As far as these local farmers-

were concerned, the strike was still in effect.
Not only did the striking farmers in Plymouth County ignore the leader
ship of the state auid national Farmers* Holiday Association, they ed.se
apparently acted outside the authority of the locetl formed, leadership.
Raymond Snyder of Kingsley held no officied. position in the Plymouth County
Holiday* Association, yet on August 25 he led a large delegation of Kingsley
**2Ibid., pp.:.1—U.
^^Xbid., September 6, 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, September 8 , 1932; auad Sioux City Journad., Septem
ber 8 , 1932.
145S i o u x

city Journal, September 8, 1932.
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area picketers to Council Bluffs to help in a milk strike at that location.
Reports indicated that Snyder assumed the role of spokesman and leader of
the pickets at Council Bluffs.

It was Snyder who threatened to lead a
h/r

raid on the Jail unless pickets held there were released. °

Another unof

ficial leader and organizer of the local Holiday was Morris Cope, also of
Kingsley.

A former Holiday member recalled Cope as "quite a talker," and

remembered him as more of a, leader in Plymouth County than C. J. Schultz.**7
As the strike progressed, Schultz lost control of the local organiza
tion and an informal leadership developed.

A newspaper list of farmers

leading the strike effort at James on September 7, did not include Schultz.
Among the leaders, however, was Morris Cope. lif
0t A few days later, at the
Governors' Conference, Iowa Governor Dan Turner called in two strike leaders,
identified only by age, for a secret meeting.

Turner informed the men that

he would be forced to call out the National Guard if the picketing did not
cease.

Turner himself estimated the men to be about thirty years of age.**9

The meeting and the. ages are significant because. CT. J. Schultz was fiftyseven at the time of the strike and seemingly excluded from an important
meeting pertaining to the strike effort.

Apparently, by the time of the

Sioux City Governors* Conference, the formal leadership of the Farmers’
Holiday Association in Plymouth County diminished, as an informal leader
ship on the part of more activist farmers emerged.
^ T b i d ., August 26 , 1932; and New York: Times, August 26, 1932, p. 1.
1*7
'Erichsen, personal interview-

^ LeMars Globe-Post, September 8, 1932.
"Governor Dan Turner: Personal Account of Farmers’ Holiday,"
October, 1961, Shover Papers.
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Striking farmers of the Sioux City area met immediately following
the Governors’ Conference and voted overwhelmingly to continue their
picketing operations.

In a mass meeting at which only Farmers* Holiday

members were admitted, a vote by a two-to-one margin favored the continua
tion of picketing.^0

Another indication that the direction of the Holiday

movement was now in the hands of new leaders rather than the original,
leadership surfaced after" a Sioux City Holiday meeting on September 18.
At the meeting, the executive council of the National Farmers* Holiday
Association voted to resume grain and livestock withholding efforts.

The

national committee suggested, however, identification and persuasion of
non-cooperating farmers rather than picketing. Si

Nevertheless, despite

this decision, some Plymouth County farmers continued to support picket
ing.

They met at Kingsley the next day and voted to maintain their opera

tions because they believed, as the LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel reported,
"to stop would Jeopardize the entire

m o v e m e n t .

"52

But farmer picketing

never achieved the intensity it had had in the preceding weeks, and it
soon faded.
James.

53

The last pickets reported were those in Plymouth County at.

When the pickets vacated their posts, the Farmers* Holiday

5Qsioux City Journal, September lU, 1932; and Herbst, "Feet In The
Grass Roots," p. ^9* At this particular meeting the crowd was anything
but an unruly mob. One-thousand farmers gathered and only actual picketers^
were allowed to vote. In order to cast a ballot , each voter had to be
identified by two fellow picketers. Although operating outside the sanc
tion of the formal Holiday organization, these were informally organized
people who earnestly believed in their picketing cause.
5^-Sioux City Journal, September 19» 1932.
52LeMar8 Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 20,. 1932.
53gjoux City Journal. September 21, 1932, p. 5.
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withholding movement also stopped.

The farm strike had achieved some

temporary success in mid-August because of direct action picketing, and
aid from the milk strike, rather than because of any plan on the part of
the Farmers* Holiday Association.

Formal leadership of the farm strike

of 1932 was an illusion given strength by the bold actions of independently
activist farmers.

The leadership that planned the Farmers* Holiday at the

national, state, and local levels in the summer, witnessed the deteriora
tion of its control as the peaceful withholding idea gave way to sometimes
violent picketing and other bold actions.
After the farm strike of August and September, 1932, the agrarian
revolt moved to the anti-foreclosure phase of its history.

The drive by

farmers to protect themselves from foreclosures had its prophets.

Report

ing on the failure of the strike around Sioux City, Donald Murphy suggested
that farmer activism would erupt again and that "it may logically take the
form of neighborhood defense against foreclosure."

A precedent for this

type of activity had been set in the Sioux City area over thirty years
earlier in the Populist movement.^

The official leadership of the Farmers*

Holiday Association was sensitive to the foreclosure threat and officially
requested a moratorium on mortgage debts at the Sioux City Governors*
Conference. ^

As the strike movement collapsed after the governors* con

ference, the Holiday Association attempted to regain the initiative by act
ing on foreclosures.

At the special executive council meeting of the

^Murphy, "Farmers Go On Strike," p. 6 7 .
^Nixon, "The Economic Basis of the Populist Movement in Iowa," p. 39^Sioux City Journal, September 11, 1932.
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national organization in Sioux City, on September 18, a resolution was
passed, urging local farmers to organize to prevent foreclosures and evic
tions during the approaching winter. ^

Once again, however, the Holiday

Association appeared to be the promoter of an idea but organizationally
incapable of following it through.

Shover concludes that the anti-fore

closure movement was "largely uncoordinated and little guided by any for
mal organization or l e a d e r s . V i e w e d from the national or state orga
nizational level, Shover*s contention has merit.
in a local context, revisions may be in order.

However, when examined
Although the formal Holiday

organization and leaders may have lost control of the movement, an informal
leadership filled the void and provided coordination for local protesting
farmers in the winter and spring of 1933.

Plymouth County is a clear case

of a local Holiday movement whose formal leadership lost control, and then
was replaced by a new authority during the anti-foreclosure crusade.
Milo Reno contributed at least one very important idea to the anti
foreclosure campaign.

He called for the formation of local "Councils of

Defense ." These Councils would operate outside the legal system and seek
agreeable arrangements between creditors and debtors, thus precluding
foreclosure proceedings.59

The Councils, which were found in many Iowa

counties, were composed of local farmers, and were the anti-foreclosure
arm of the Farmers* Holiday Association.^

Although they were organized

^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 20, 1932.
5®Shover, "The Penny-Auction Rebellion," p. 6 6 .
59i)yson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 131.
^°Iowa Union Farmer. December 28, 1932.
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for purposes of peaceable negotiation of farm debts, the Councils clearly
directed large numbers of Holiday members when direct action was desired.
A Journalist, who observed them in operation in the LeMars area, reported
that the Councils stemmed directly from the Holiday movement, and, if they
determined a farm foreclosure unjust, word passed "to a thousand farmers
and the foreclosure is halted."^

The Council of Defense arbitration

idea appeared so practical that authorities at the Iowa Agricultural Exper
iment Station at Ames, recognized it in early 1933, as an important means
by which farmers could achieve some adjustment of their burdensome debts. ^
The CounciL of Defense concept emerged quickly in Plymouth County as
desperate farmers sought to ward off foreclosure.

On December 26, 1932, the LeMars Globe-Post announced that Plymouth
County could expect an "avalanche" of foreclosure sales if the agricultural
fa

situation persisted. 3

On Dec ember 27, some farmers in Plymouth County,

headed by Sam Mosher, formed their Council of Defense and addressed the
task of negotiating mortgage debt s. ^

The history of the Plymouth County

version of the Council of Defense was short and stormy.
An ambiguous relationship existed between the Farmers* Holiday Asso
ciation and the Council of Defense in Plymouth County.

The Sioux City

Journal reported that many members of the Council of Defense were also
^Prescott, "An Iowa Foreclosure," p. 198*
^Murray

and Bentley, The Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 8U.

^ LeMars Globe-Post, December 26, 1932.
6**Sioux City Journal, January 9, 1933.
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Farm Holiday members.

The newspaper cautioned, however, that "the Council

I3 functioning separately from the holiday group."^5

Further Journal re-

ports suggested that the Council of Defense was a separate organization
with a body of ten officers and directors.^

Substantiation for this sep

arate organization theory appeared in a LeMars Globe-Post story.

The

LeMars newspaper referred to the Council of Defense as an arm of a group
entitled the Farmers* Protective Association.

According to this account,

the Council was the ten-member foreclosure negotiating body for the Pro
tective Association.^

One indication that the Council of Defense operated

as a distinct and separate body from the Farmers* Holiday Association cen
ters on the fact that C. J. Schultz, Holiday chief in Plymouth County,
received recognition as only a member of the Council.
as an officer or director in the Council of Defense.^®

He was not listed
Yet, when Schultz

communicated with Reno on January 7* 1933, he wrote of "our defense Council,"
and stated, "we have got up speed, nothing can stop us n o w . T h e tone
of Schultz* letter suggests that the local Holiday Association controlled
the Council.
Despite the ambiguous relationship between the Council and the Holiday
Association alluded to in the local press, two points seem reasonably clear.
^^Ibid., January 8, 1933.
66Ibid.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 5, 1933. This story is the only reference
to the Farmers* Protective Association in Plymouth County. Earlier a Farm
ers* Protective Association formed during the "Cow War" in Cedar County,
Iowa, in 1931. Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 31—33.
ro
0 LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 1933.
J. Schultz to Milo Reno, January 7, 1933, Reno Papers.
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First , the Council operated as the anti-foreclosure body of the local Holi
day movement and as such could gather large numbers of farmers to halt fore
closure sales when negotiations failed.

Second, even though formal Holiday

leadership deteriorated during the anti-foreclosure movement, there existed
an informal leadership and coordination in the activities of protesting
farmers in Plymouth County.

A detailed discussion of the history of the

Council of Defense illuminates the importance of this segment of the 1930s
farm revolt.
The membership of the Farmers* Holiday Association and the Council of
Defense clearly overlapped.

The only available lists of Council members

reveal that most were also involved with the Holiday group.7^

Sam Mosher,

for example, helped organize the Sioux City Milk Producers* Association,
and held membership in the Farmers* Holiday.

In addition, Mosher served

as chairman of the, Plymouth County Council of Defense during the antiforeclosure period.71
The Plymouth County Council of Defense attained notable success in
its early phase of operation.

In the first two weeks of existence, more

than a dozen foreclosures were settled by bringing creditors and debtors
together for agreeable talks.

72

The most spectacular achievement of the

Council occurred on January U, 1933, when an estimated 800 farmers stopped
7°Sioux City Journal. January 8 , 1933; and LeMars Globe-Post, January
9, 1933.

77Dyson, "The Farm'Holiday Movement," p. 80; and Sioux City Joumal,
January 8 , 1933.
72C. J. Schultz to Milo Reno, January 7» 1933, Reno Papers.
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a foreclosure sale and forced a New York insurance company to raise its
bid on a piece of farm sale property.

Potential bidders were silenced by

the crowd of farmers and the representative of the insurance company was
threatened with lynching unless he agreed to wire the company for a change
in their bid.^

Three days later the presence of 1000 farmers convinced

officials to cancel another foreclosure sale.T*4 In praise of these bold
direct actions, Milo Reno wrote to Lawrence Casper, Plymouth County Holi
day and Council member, that, "you boys have done more to put the Farmers*
Holiday on the map and fix it there for the future than any other group in
the United States."75

Reno’s praiseworthy remarks were based on the illu

sion that what had happened in Plymouth County signaled the resurgence of
Farmers* Holiday activism*

To the contrary, what had happened in Plymouth

County was a brief moment in the spotlight before serious organizational
problems wrecked the local Farmers* Holiday Association and the Council
of Defense, and destroyed the driving force of the area's farm revolt.
From the beginning, the Plymouth County Council of Defense apparently
lacked strong formal leadership.

On January 1, 1933, the Council massed

its members in LeMars to prevent a tax sale.

Reports indicated that UOO

to 500 farmers attended and halted the sale.

With the sale halted an

independent group of farmers, led by Morris Cope and Charles Lite, sought
signatures on a petition asking for a moratorium on debts and a repeal of
the deficiency law.

The petition was to be forwarded to the Iowa governor

^% e w York Times, January 5, 1933, p. lU; and LeMars Globe-Post^
January 5, 1933.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 193?.
75m 11o Reno to Lawrence Casper, January 6, 1933, Reno Papers.
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for action.

Although the idea of the petition may have been agreeable,

the organizers were not the formal leaders of the local Holiday group or
Council of Defense.^
Three days later, after the Holiday group and the Council of Defense
assembled their farmer members and forced the Hew York insurance company
to raise bids on a piece of property* another independent action occurred.
Operating without the sanction of local farm leaders, a group of farmers
marched on a LeMars implement shop and attempted to reclaim a repossessed
tractor.

The tractor incident developed impulsively and, although tempo-

rarily threatening, proved ineffective because the implement dealer locked
his doors, ignored the farmers* protests, and later reopened without inci77
dent. '

Events of this nature were symptomatic of what one farm leader

meant when he told a reporter that "sometimes the boys get out of hand."^®
The lack of clear leadership and organizational control of the "boys”
grew throughout January.

Approximately 1000 farmers gathered to prohibit

a tax sale on January 7°

With the sale postponed * the farmers then held a

rally on the courthouse lawn.

Ella Reeve Bloor, from Sioux City, addressed

the crowd and urged them to organize a march and demonstration at the state
capitol.

Probably unknown to the local farmers at the time was Bloor rs

position as local farm organizer for the Communist Party.

A petition of

support for Bloor*s suggested march and demonstration circulated and received
many farmers* signatures.

Later C. J. Schultz, speaking for the Farmers*

^LeMars Globe-Post, January 2, 1933.
77
Sioux City Journal. January 5* 1933* p. 2. A possible precedent for
this action may have been set by farmers in Newman Grove, Nebraska, onehundred miles southwest of LeMars, when Nebraska Holiday members reclaimed
two repossessed trucks on October 6 , 1932. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 72.
Sioux City Journal. January 8 , 1933, p. 2.
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Holiday, indicated that his group would "he better served if ve stay right
here and watch Plymouth County.’1 In fact, while the mass of farmers gath
ered outside the courthouse for Bloor’s speech, Schultz and the Council of
Defense met in the judge's chambers to negotiate another foreclosure case. T9
At this point the formal Holiday leadership and divergent elements of the
local organization appeared to be moving in different directions.
The loss of leadership by Schultz, Mosher, and other local heads of
the Holiday movement worsened as the winter progressed.

On the day of the

courthouse rally, a small group of farmers went to the local Farm Bureau
office in LeMars and, claiming "We’re the law hereJ" told the county agent
to get out of town.

The feeling was that the agent had been unfair in

administering federal feed and seed loans.®®

On the same day, a group of

farmers surrounded and threatened the representatives of the LeMars SemiWeekly Sentinel who were covering the rally.

Reportedly, the farmers de

manded, upon threat of lynching that the Sentinel change its position and
take a more favorable stance on the farmers' movement.
By late January, a group of farmers operating independently, employed
a new technique in which they approached landlords and businessmen and
demanded the surrender of debt notes against farmers.

The Council of

79
LeMars Globe-Post, January 9* 1933. A picture along with the names
of the Council of Defense that met that day appeared in the paper. Noticeably
absent was Morris Cope whose name has surfaced many times as an informal
leader of farmers in Plymouth County. One can only speculate that this known
activist was probably in the crowd of farmers on the courthouse lawn on Jan
uary 7 .
®®Ibid.; and Prescott, "An Iowa Foreclosure," p. 199.
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel. January 10, 1933.
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Defense claimed no knowledge of such activities.8^

On January 25, the

sale of a house in LeMars itself was halted hy farmers, indicating further
hold actions.88

The local organizational leadership seemingly lost control

as independent factions in the county went their own direction.

By this

time, it appeared that the local Holiday organization had no well-defined
purpose or direction.

Combined with a lack of solid leadership, the local

movement suffered from impulsive actions by independent groups of farmers.
In the spring of 1933, an extremely activist faction of farmers dom
inated the rebellion in Plymouth County.

A long pending foreclosure suit

threatened Ed Durband with eviction from his farm northwest of LeMars.

On

March 23, the local Council of Defense, suggesting that the mortgage holder
had been reasonable with Durband, voted to give up on its attempt to settle
the case.8** But a separate group of farmers, at least thirty to forty
strong, ignored the Council’s decision and attempted to prevent Durband’s
eviction.

When the county sheriff ordered the farmers guarding the farm

to clear the way for eviction, he was informed that the Council of Defense
did not bind them.

The local press covering the developments reported that

an apparently new informal group of farmers had organized.8^

This new

group demonstrated their strength by preventing the eviction of Durband
v

^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 23, 1933.
0-3

Ibid., January 26, 1933; and Iowa Union Farmer, February 8 , 1933.
In this case farmers acted to protect the house of a dentist who graciously
extended payments for farmers who owed him for services.
8**LeMars Globe-Post, March 23, 1933.

85Ibid., March 27, 1933.
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os
for a month.00

John Le Moine, one farmer who participated in the Durband

episode, believed that the faction was led by two or three radicals whom
he did not identify.^
In late April, this more radical faction of the Plymouth County farm
movement planned and executed a series of protests that briefly demonstrated
their influence, but seriously damaged the local Farmers* Holiday Associa
tion.

On April 27, a crowd of 200 to 300 Plymouth County farmers went to

Primghar, in O ’Brien County to stop a foreclosure sale.88

A hint that the

demonstration was well-planned surfaced when O ’Brien County’s leading news
paper later revealed a letter it had received, suggesting that its presence
at Primghar on April 27, would get a good story.8^

Harold Rohwer, arrested

after the Primghar incident for his involvement in a fight with deputies,
later testified that O ’Brien County farmers would have handled the fore
closure suit peacefully, "but the bunch from LeMars came up and started a
fight."9®

Trial testimony later identified Morris Cope of Kingsley as the

leader of the Plymouth County contingent-.91
Following the affair at Primghar, the farmers went to the Durband farnr
and then on to LeMars where they attacked Judge Bradley.^

8% b i d ., April 16, 1933.
8^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 12, 1933.
88Q*Brien County Bell. May 3, 1933.
8q
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
^ O ’Brien County Bell, May 10, 1933.
^ LeMars Sami-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
^ LeMars Globe-Post. May 1, 1933.
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attack on Bradley appeared planned.

A newspaper reported that Morris Cope,

speaking to the crovd earlier in the day at Primghar, urged the farmers to
"go to LeMars and get Judge

Bradley."^

Later trial testimony confirmed

that Cope had led the violent attack on the judge.9**
Milo Reno was quick to condemn the violence in Plymouth and O'Brien,
Counties

in

fact, he contended that outside influences, particularly

Communists, were the cause of such violent t act i c s . 96

But Reno was mis

taken, and his Judgement revealed his lack of insight into the workings of
the organization he had fathered.

The LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel edito

rialized:
When the farm strike "brought defiance of law and order and dis
regard of the rights of others and failed to bring any relief
many of these representative farmers severed active connection
with the organization and its leadership passed into the hands
of a small group of men whose unlawful actions culminated in the
disgraceful affair last T h u r s d a y . 97
Some support for the Sentinelrs opinion exists. The LeMars Globe-Post
thoroughly and accurately reported the events of April 27 and subsequent
developments.

In its coverage, the violence of that day was in no way

linked to the Farmers* Holiday Association or the Council of

D e f e n s e .

98

Although some of those later arrested and convicted were members of both
93ieMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
9**LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933.
95shover» Combelt Rebellion, p. 12U.
96Farm Holiday News. July, 1933.
97LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 3, 1933.
9^LeMars Globe-Post, May and June, 1933.
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organizations, they probably did not represent those farmer groups on that
fateful day in late April.
The actions of the radical faction of fanners seriously damaged Plym
outh County farmers* organized efforts to deal with the depression.

Holiday

and Council leaders, although not involved in the April 27 violence, were
arrested under martial law authority placed on the county.
of many of those involved with the Holiday resulted.
of the Council of Defense, was arrested on April 2 9 . "

Sweeping arrests

Sam Mosher, chairman
A week later au

thorities arrested C. J. Schultz, head of the local Farmers* Holiday Asso
ciation.100

Ironically, while the leaders of the formal organizations were

imprisoned, Morris Cope, an identified leader of the more radical farmers*
faction, remained in hiding until he turned himself in on July 19 .101

Dam

aged by a small faction*s violent behavior and the resultant martial law
decree, the local farm movement collapsed in early May, 1933.
Shover concludes that the spontaneous activity in the farm strike and
anti-foreclosure movement gave the Holiday Association its driving force.
In Plymouth County, bold, planned actions by a group of farmers led pri
marily by Morris Cope gave the local Holiday its driving force.

When this

element fell prey to martial law, the county’s organization lost its momen
tum.

During the two months following the Bradley incident, neither the

previously faithful Globe-Post nor the Sentinel reported anything on Holiday
" ibid., May 1, 1933.
lOOffew York Times, May 6 , 1933, p. 6 .
101LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933.

102Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. 166.
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activities. 103

At least one of these local newspapers had previously

granted generous attention to the farmers* movement.

Ostensibly* in May

and June, 1933» there was nothing to report as the Plymouth County Farmers*
Holiday Association ceased to function as a viable farmers* movement.

103
LeMars Globe-Post, May and June, 1933I a^d LeMars Semi-Weekly
Sentinel, May and June, 1933.

CHAPTER V

WHO REVOLTED?
Immediately after the violence in Plymouth County on April 27, 1933,
speculation mounted as to who was involved in the rural uprising.

Iowa

Governor Clyde Herring proclaimed martial law in the county, declaring
"Sioux City hoodlums were in the crowd that attacked the Judge."

Within

a week of the near-lynching, Park A. Findley, who as head of the Iowa Bu
reau of Investigation was dispatched to LeMars to investigate the farm
violence, claimed "red "backing" existed in the local upheaval.

Charges

of Communist involvement had surfaced as early as the farm strike in the
autumn of 1932.

Despite the concerns about outside influences, available

evidence suggests that the farm revolt in Plymouth County comprised a move
ment of and by local farmers.
National press coverage of the rural revolt is helpful in determining
the farmer composition of the uprising in Plymouth County.

Writing for

ScribnerTs, Josephine Herbst visited the picket lines around Sioux City
during the farm strike in the late summer of 1932, and found the picketers
to be local farmers.**

Remley Glass, a small town northwest Iowa lawyer

during the 1930s, wrote an article for Harper*s on the agrarian insurgency.
-^New York Times, April 29, 1933, p. 1.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 2, 1933•^Ibid., September 16, 1932.
^Herbst, "Feet In The Grass Roots,” pp. U6-51.
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9h

He found the activists in the uprising to he farmers threatened by economic
depression.^
outsiders.

Humors had circulated that the farm activists vere actually
Based on these rumors, Philip Stevenson, representing Common

Sense, visited the cornbelt and attended farm meetings.

Stevenson re

ported that tfthe strikers vere not hums, not agitators, hut farmers
£
threatened with losing their land.”
Local newspaper reports also confirmed the fact that those involved
in the rural rebellion were area farmers.

After the major confrontation

between six-hundred pickets and fifty law enforcement officials at James,
Iowa, on September 7, 1932, rumors circulated that Sioux City agitators
caused this most serious of the farm strike incidents.^

However, only

two newspaper reporters, one from the LeMars Globe-Post and one from the
Sioux City Journal, neared the picket line that day.

The editor of the

LeMars paper announced that ”the men who held the picket line yesterday
were practically all real farmers.

I know because I know them personally.’

The Sioux City Journal confirmed the presence of local farmers at the
James incident and reported discussions with farmers- involved.^
Prominent observers of the most serious and violent incident of the
agricultural rebellion in Plymouth County also concluded that the insur
gency consisted of local farmers.

Commenting on the arrests after the

^Glass, ’’Gentlemen, The Corn Belt!” pp. 199-209.
^Stevenson, ’’Reno’s Cost of Production," p. 11.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 9» 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, September 8 , 1932.
^Sioux City Journal. September 8 , 1932.

o
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attack on Judge Bradley, Wallace Short attested to the character of those
involved.

Short, a one-time mayor of Sioux City, an Iova legislator, a

minister, and publisher of the local labor newspaper, the Unionist and
Public Forum, mingled among those arrested and later held in a LeMars
stockade.

Short knew the men to be farmers.

He is reported to have said

that because of the arrests of local farmers, "at least two Sunday schools
will be without superintendents."^-®

Another report that the f^arm rebel

lion consisted of farmers came from a prominent Plymouth County politician.
Gustave Alesch, Plymouth County farmer and representative in the Iowa
Legislature, attributed the Bradley incident to mob psychology, but noted
that the mob of attackers were local farmers.

Finally, R. F. Starzl,

editor of the LeMars Globe-Post. attested to the farmer composition of the
rebellion in the county.

Starzl had followed the mob that assaulted Judge

Bradley from the courthouse to the site of the near-lynching.

The editor

later testified in court that he recognized many of the men present and
knew them to be farmers.
The fact that arrests during the farm strike of August and September,

1932, failed to turn up any outsiders, seems to verify the farmer element
in the agricultural uprising.

The first arrests for blockading highways

in the Sioux City area occurred on September 13.

The Sioux City Journal

announced the arrest of five men; all were farmers from the territory
^■®Mrs. Wallace M. Short, Just One American, (Sioux City:
19^3), p. 15U.

By the Author,

-^Roland S. White, Milo Reno:Farmers1 Union Pioneer, (Iowa City:
Athens Press, 19^1), pp. 1^8-i+9.
1^LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933, p. 6 .
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surrounding Sioux City.^-3

few days later the first mass arrest of pick

a

ets occurred as officials attempted to clear the highways around Sioux City.
Hinety arrests resulted and these picketers were detained in the Woodbury
County Jail in Sioux City.

This group consisted of men from the area sur

rounding Sioux City, including Plymouth County.

Of the group of ninety

picketers arrested, a reporter discovered that, "five were farm owners;
twenty had owned farms and were now renters; twenty-five had always been
renters; fifteen were farm boys living with their parents; seventeen were
farm laborers long living in the community; and there were eight packing
house employees."^
The arrest record for Plymouth County further substantiates the farm
er composition of the 1930s agrarian rebellion.

The first arrests in

Plymouth County followed the near-lynching of Judge Bradley.

Because of

conflicting reports, -it is difficult to determine the exact number of
arrests.

On May 3, following the attack, the New York Times announced

that 105 men were in custody.^

However, on the next day the LeMars

Globe-Post reported a total of only sixty-nine arrested.

16

Probably

the New York paper included all the arrests in Plymouth and O ’Brien
Counties, both of which experienced violence in the farm revolt on April
27.

On May 6, the Des Moines Register recorded ninety-two arrested in

Plymouth County alone and identified them all as farmers.1^

3-3sjoux City Journal, September lU, 1932.
^Vorse, "Rebellion In The Cornbelt," p.
^-5New York Times, May 3, 1933, p. 8.
^6LeMars Globe-Post, May

1933.

3-7Pes Moines Register, May 6, 1933, p. 1.

Generally,
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however, there was -uncertainty in the actual number arrested.

Even the

local Globe-Post account of sixty-nine arrests is unclear, because pub
lished reports provided far fewer than sixty-nine names.
certain:

This much is

by cross-referencing local press coverage of actions after the

-assault on the Judge, a total of thirty-eight Plymouth County residents
were named.

Some of the arrests were not made until more than two months

after the incident because of successful evasion by at least two individ
uals.^-®

Important Plymouth County court records are missing for pertinent

cases relative to the April 27* assault.

Thus, the Criminal Court files

of Morris Cope, Ed Casper, Martin Rosburg, and Dick Popken are missing.
These men all received convictions on various assault charges. ^

Further

more, most of the arrests occurred while Plymouth County was under declara
tion of martial law.

Therefore, the Iowa National Guard was in charge of

all arrests during a two week period.

Two previous scholars of the farm

rebellion, John Shover and Lowell Dyson, were unable to locate the National
Guard records of this incident.

pn

So, a compilation of newspaper reports

provides the available arrest evidence.

Of the thirty-eight persons ar

rested in Plymouth County, all were identified as farm owners, farm renters,
or farm hands.

Pi

•*-®LeMars Globe-Post, May 1, U, 29, July 13, and 20, 1933; LeMars SemiWeekly Sentinel, May 12, and June 1, 1933; and Sioux City Journal, May 1,
3, and 11, 1933.
County Criminal Court Records, Canes 782 A, 789 A, 791 A,
and 792 A, Court House, LeMars, Iowa.
■^Plymouth

^®Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 121.
glLeMars Globe-Post, May 1, li, 29, and July 13 and 20, 1933; LeMars
Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 12 and June 1, 1933; and Sioux City Journal, May
1 , 3, and 11, 1933.
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An examination of the people associated in some way with the Farm
Holiday movement from August, 1932, to May, 1933* further documents the
farming status of those involved in the rebellion.

By utilizing local

newspaper coverage of the farm strike in August and September, 1932; the
anti-foreclosure sale campaign of January and February, 1933; an<l the
assault on Judge Bradley and subsequent arrests in April and May, 1933*
an interesting pattern emerges.

Newspaper reports about organizational

meetings, leaders, committee members, incidents of farm activism, and
arrests revealed sixty different names in some way associated with the
Plymouth County farmers' rebellion.

Of the sixty names, fifty-six were

Plymouth County farmers or farm workers.
boring counties.

22

Three were farmers from neigh-

Only one person actively involved or associated with

the rebellion appeared to be an outsider.

That person was Mother Ella

Reeve Bloor, reportedly from Sioux City, and formerly from North Dakota.
Ironically, Mother Bloor's position as a prominent figure in the Communist
Party escaped the attention of local newspapers.

Although Bloor was present

in LeMars, she apparently did not have a substantial impact on area farmers.
One final indication of the presence of local farmers in the 1930s
rebellion in Plymouth County can be found in the conviction and sentence
record for those arrested in the Bradley incident.

Although thirty-eight

22

LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932, and January, February,
April, and May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-tfeekly Sentinel, August and September,
1932, and January and May, 1933*
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 9* 1933; and John L. Shover, "The Commu
nist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis of 1933*” Journal of American
History 51 (September, 1964): 255• Bloor, along with Harold Ware and
Lem Harris, provided the nucleus of a Communist effort to lead the farm
revolt. A more complete discussion of Communist involvement in the
Plymouth County revolt is found in Chapter VI of this study.

23
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vere arrested, only twelve vere convicted in subsequent legal

p r o c e e d i n g s .2^

Three of the twelve vere cited for contempt of court and sentenced to one
day in jail with fines of $50.^

Seven received suspended jail sentences

of varying Lengths on different assault charges.

26

and A. A. Mitchell, served lengthy jail sentences.

Only two, Morris Cope
Cope received one year

in the state penitentiary, paroled to the local county sheriff to serve his
time with the opportunity for release time to complete farm work.

27

received thirty days in the county jail and served his time fully*

Mitchell

oft

All

of these men vere local farmers, and, in view of the number of eyewitnesses
-available to testify against them, the limited number of convictions and
the frequency of suspended sentences suggests leniency by local officials.29
Although the farm rebellion in Plymouth County consisted almost exclu
sively of local farmers, they represented only a minority of the farm popu
lation in the county.

In 1932 there vere 823 farm owners, 272 part-owners,

and 1770 tenants in Plymouth County.

This total number of 2865 farmers for

1932 does not account for any hired farm laborers."3®

Farm population data

and reports of farmer activism demonstrates a distinct minority of the
^ LeMars Globe-Post May 29 and July 13, 1933; LeMars Semi-Weekly
Sentinel, July 21, 1933; and Des Moines Register, June 28, 1933, p. 16.
^LeMars Globe-Post, July 13, 1933.
^ Ibid., May 29, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933*
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933.
28pes Moines Register, .June 28, 1933, p. l6.
29a further indication of leniency surfaced in a search of the Plym
outh County Sheriff's Department records. A letter found there, written by
Sheriff Rippey to Governor Herring on June 12,.1931+, requested a reduction
of Morris Cope's sentence. Plymouth County Sheriff's Department Criminal
Files, Number 105, Ed Casper and Morris Cope, Court House, LeMars, Iova.
30uSDA, Iova Agricultural Statistics, Plymouth County, p. h o .
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county’s agrarian element involved in the rebellion.

That a small percent

age of the county’s farmers participated in the revolt is not surprising.
Such a condition is probably not unusual, in protest movements.

But, an

examination of the numbers of farmers involved reveals much about the na
ture of the brief rebellion in Plymouth County.
The largest reported group of farm pickets during the strike of
August and September, 1932, was 1000 to 1500, guarding the roads near
James on the night of August lU and 1 5 . ^

If the maximum number of this

press estimate was actually present, it would have indicated slightly over
50 percent of Plymouth County’s farmers involved in at least one picketing
incident.

However, farmers from the surrounding counties of Woodbury in

Iowa, and Union in South Dakota, helped swell the picket lines.^

There

fore , even at the largest gathering of protesting farmers during the strike
only a minority of Plymouth County’s 2865 farmers were involved.
At the most violent incident of the farm strike, less than one-fourth
of the county’s farmers participated.

On September 7, at the "Battle of

James," a convoy of trucks escorted by deputies attempted to break the
farmers' blockade.

The LeMars Globe-Post estimated approximately 600

farmers at the incident with another U00 onlookers.33

if a n those pres

ent were from Plymouth County, a fact which seems improbable, they would
have represented approximately 20 percent of the county's farmers.

-^-LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
^ Sioux City Journal, August 15, 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, September 8, 1932.
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Reports of large gatherings of farmers also emerged during the anti
foreclosure sale movement in the winter of 1932-33.

On January 2, 1933,

**00 to 500 farmers massed to halt a tax sale in LeMars.
1000 farmers met and halted a foreclosure

Five days later,

s a l e . 3 ^

Reports vary on the number of people involved in the near-lynching of
Judge Bradley.

A neighboring county newspaper claimed that 600 to 1000

men were present at the incident,35 -but one of the LeMars newspapers esti
mated that only 200 to 300 men participated.3^

Perhaps most indicative

of the number involved in the assault was the report, when martial law had
been declared, that the National Guard had the names of 250 men present at
bhe attack.
Suggestive of the small portion of farmers involved in the rebellion
were the names of the fifty-six Plymouth County activists whose names ap
peared in print because of some association with the agrarian

u p r i s i n g . 3®

These men constituted only about 2 percent of the farmers in the county.
Based on available evidence, the farm revolt in Plymouth County was
a distinct minority movement.

On most occasions, only 10 to 12 percent

of the area farmers could be counted at meetings and incidents of agrarian
rebellion.

And only 2 to 3 percent were specifically named in the

3^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, January 3 and 10, 1933.
35o*Brien County Bell, May 3, 1933.
3^LeMars Semi,-Weekly Sentinel, May 2, 1933.
37LeMars Globe-Post, May U , 1933.
38lbid., August and September, 1932, and January, February, April, and
May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, August and September, 1932, and
January and May, 1933.
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newspapers.

But it is a rare activist movement that attracts major numbers.

The mere physical -assembly of large groups of farmers, ranging from 200 to
1500 in number, for purposes of striking, protesting, and stopping aales,
indicates the strength of the Farm Holiday movement in the county.

More

over, on a comparable basis, the number of participants in Plymouth County
is significant.

In his study of the farm revolt, Shover found no other

locality that surpassed Plymouth County in numbers of farmers actively
involved in rebellion incidents.

Shover has also noted that Plymouth rank

ed second in frequency of incidents of farmer activism.39

Even though a

minority of the county’s farmers participated in the agrarian movement,
they did so with notoriety and an effectiveness that placed Plymouth in the
center of the 1930s farm rebellion.
The geographical distribution of farmers involved in the Plymouth
County rebellion provides further insight into the county's farm movement.
Utilizing the 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory and newspaper
reported addresses, a reasonably accurate distribution of farmer activists
can be attained.

Of the fifty-six names that appeared in press reports

during the rebellion, fifty-two were located.

Map 5 on the following page

demonstrates the approximate geographical distribution of the farmer par
ticipants in the rebellion.
The most outstanding characteristic of the distribution of rebellious
farmers was its concentration in the southeastern section of Plymouth

39shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 3-U6 .
^ LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932, and January and May,
1933; and 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, (Sioux City: The
Great Western Map Company, 193V), pp. 1-25. The Atlas and Farm Directory,
provides data for the year 1933.
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MAP 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PLYMOUTH COUNTY REBELLION PARTICIPANTS
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County.

Thirty-two of the fifty-two located farmers came from the six

southeastern townships of the county, with Stanton and Henry townships
accounting for eighteen of the identified farmers.

Such heavy concentra

tion in one area suggests special circumstances in that portion of the
county.
To further substantiate the location of identified farmer activists
in southeastern Plymouth County, an examination of the arrest record fol
lowing the assault on Judge Bradley is helpful.

Thirty-eight names of

arrested farmers appeared in local newspaper coverage after the attack.
The county-wide distribution of the arrested farmers is illustrated on
Map 6.

Out of the total of thirty-eight reported arrested farmers, thirty-

five have been located.

The residences of seventeen of the located farm

ers were in the six southeastern townships of the county.

Eleven of those

arrested resided in the previously mentioned townships of Stanton and
Henry.

liP

When compared with the areas of most organizational activity

(see Map 4), and number of participants in various phases of the rebellion,
the arrest distribution further suggests the concentration of rebellious
farmers in southeastern Plymouth County.
Twelve convictions resulted from the investigation and trials of those
involved in Bradley*s assault.

Three were given minor contempt citations.

Nine men were convicted on various assault charges.

Once again the area

of residence of this activist element was the southeastern section of the

^LeMars Globe-Post, May 1, 1+, 19* July 13, and 20, 1933; LeMars SemiWeekly Sentinel, May 12, and June 1, 1933; and Sioux City Journal, May 1,
3, and 11, 1933.
^ Ibid.; and 193*+ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 1-25.
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county.

Five of the convicted men lived in the townships of Stanton, Lin

coln, or

Union.

**3

Thus, in terms of arrests, southeastern Plymouth County

also seemed to be the center of farmer activism.
Perhaps the key to the Plymouth County farm rebellion, centered in the
southeastern section of the county, is found in the land-holding status of
participating farmers.

Shover found, by way of thirty-five personal in

terviews, that survivors of the farm uprising were almost unanimous in their
belief that the movement was one of property holders.^

But based on the

land-owning situation in Plymouth County, some revision of Shover*s inter
pretation may be in order.

Relying on the list of fifty-six farmers, prop

erty-holding was not common to rebellious farmers in Plymouth County.^5
Only thirteen of the reported farmers owned land in 1933, among them were
C. JV Schultz, I. W. Reck, and Morris Cope.

Yet, these men held leadership

positions in the Farmers* Holiday Association, the milk strike, or in spon
taneous incidents during the rebellion.

Of the three, only Schultz held a

sizable amount of land, claiming 266 acres.^

The thirteen property-holding

farm activists were relatively large land holders, averaging 230 acres each
in 1933.^
acres.1*®

In that year, the average size farm in the county was only 190
Nine of the thirteen property holders resided in the six

**3rbia.
^Shover, ’’Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis of 1933," pp.
2U8-U9. Shover travelled the area of the farm rebellion in 19^1 and located
and interviewed survivors.
**5l93H Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 1-25.
^ Ibid., p. IT, 1 8 , and 25.
^Tlbid.« p. 12, lU, and 23.
^^USDA, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1933, p. 222.
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southeastern townships of the county; seven maintained their land in Stan
ton and Henry townships. ^

Shover*s contention of a property holder’s

rebellion does not fit the evidence from Plymouth County.

However, perhaps

the small element of property holding farmers mentioned above provided im
portant leadership in the local revolt.
Of the forty-three non-property holders involved in some way in the
rebellion, thirty-nine were located.

Map 7 on the following page shows the

distribution of non-propertied rebellious farmers in Plymouth County.^

The concentration in the southeastern part of the county is again noteworthy.
However, since a relatively large number of participants were non-property
holders, the suggestion of a rebellion by propertied people threatened with
loss of property is called into question.

Hon-propertied fanners were cer

tainly afflicted by the depression, but were not threatened with loss of
land.

What, then, motivated direct action and rebellion among this group

of farmers?
Perhaps the answer to the above question lies in the farming status of
many of the forty-three non-propertied rebellious farmers in Plymouth County.
Sixteen of the non-propertied class farmed with or for their parents.
8 shows the

Map

distribution of thosefarmers with a connection to their parent’s

land.

Mostof this group resided

ty. ^

It seems reasonable to assume that these farmers normally would have

^^193U

in the southeastern portion of the coun

Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory,pp. 12-25.

5^Ibid», pp. 1-25; and LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932,
and January, February, April, and May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel,
August and September, 1932, and January and May, 1933.
^ 1 9 3k Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 1-25.
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inherited their parent’s property at some future date.

In Plymouth County

in the 1930s , this situation presented special circumstances that contrib
uted to some of the most serious agrarian rebellion.
Two previous studies of the farm revolt concluded that the average
age of participating farmers exceeded forty.

Frank Dileva found that the
r

---------------------------------------------------------------------— -

-

age of rebellious farmers in the many scattered incidents of the Iowa
rebellion averaged U2.5 years. ^

Shover determined, through a question

naire distributed in the early 1960s, that the average age of former Farmco
ers' Holiday respondents was U3.5 years.
But, based on the list of the
fifty-six identified Plymouth County activists, a somewhat younger age for
rebellious farmers emerges.
men.

Ages were given for sixteen of the identified

The average newspaper reported age for these rebellious farmers was

3^.5**

With the ages of. less than one-third of the actively involved farm

ers available, conclusions must obviously be tentative.

Nevertheless, the

fact that the average age for Plymouth County farmers seemingly differs
as much as eight to nine years from earlier studies may be meaningful.
With parents twenty-five to thirty years their senior, farmers in line for
parental lands may have already inherited the land or assumed general man
agement of a farm by age forty-two or forty-three.

However, a farmer at

age thirty-four, working with his parents on a farm was likely to find the
parents still actively involved in the operation.

Thus, the relatively

^Dileva, "Farm Revolts," p. 108.
5^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. IT*
bers responded to Shover’s questionnaire.

Thirty-four former Holiday mem

5^LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932, and January, February,
April, and May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, August and September,
1932, and January and May, 1933.
—
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young rebellious farmers in Plymouth County found themselves propertyless and threatened not by the loss of their own land, but rather by
the loss of a family farm which might some day be theirs.

For more than

one-fourth of the identified farmer activists in Plymouth County, the
above potential threat posed real danger.^

The existence of farmers

endangered in the described manner in a small section of the county estab
lished an interesting combination of circumstances.

In a restricted area

of the county, important elements of the farm rebellion merged.

Influen

tial propertied farmers such as C. J. Schultz and I. W. Reck possessed
leadership talents.

In the same area, an element of relatively young, un-

propertied farmers, who stood to inherit their parents’ land, were concen
trated,

Set against these human features, the southeastern part of the

county received the most severe impact from the depressed agricultural
conditions of 1930 to 1933* In this environment, propertied leaders, wouldbe land holders, and unpropertied farmers, all threatened with the loss of
their livelihood, provided the human ingredient in the 1932-33 agricultural
rebellion in Plymouth County.
The case of one particular Plymouth County farmer may be instructive
in an attempt to fully comprehend the nature of those who rose in rebellion.
Morris Cope was a successful farmer, seriously threatened by the depression.
Although a member of the Farmers* Holiday Association, he operated as an
independent agrarian rebel, and left an indelible mark on the 1932-33 farm
ers* rebellion.

Throughout the unrest, Cope always appeared at significant

events even though he held no official position among the farmers.

He

^ I b i d .; and 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. l-25«
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apparently was the chief organizer in an attempt to blockade Plymouth
County farm produce from sale in Cherokee.

Then, at a crossroads meeting

on August 30, 1932, Cope and others vere shot at for their organizing efforts.^

In January, 1933, during the anti-foreclosure movement, he vas

among those vho circulated a petition for a moratorium on farm debts and
57

urged a march on the state capitol in pursuit of such legislation. 1 On
April 27, 1933, prior to the assault on Judge Bradley, he led a group of
Plymouth County farmers to nearby Primghar, Iova, and sought to stop a
foreclosure sale.

In a fight vith local sheriff’s deputies, Cope suffered

head injuries vhich later required medical attention.^®

On the same day,

he also reportedly led the attack on Judge Bradley of LeMars. 59^
assault on the judge, he avoided arrest for over tvo months.

After the

A Hartley,

Iova, doctor revealed that he had treated Cope’s head injury, after vhich
Cope fled to South Dakota vith another suspect.

Upon surrender, he vas

convicted on assault charges, based on testimony that he vas the leader
of the rebellious farmers in the attack on the judge.

His sentence of one

year in the state peniteniary, paroled to the county jail, vas the harshest
sentence handed out for illegal actions on the part of rebellious farmers
in Plymouth County.^1
5^Sioux City Journal, August 31, 1932.
5?LeMars Globe-Post, January 2, 1933.
5^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
59LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933.
^Qsioux City Journal, May 1+ and 11 , 1933.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933. A search of Plymouth
County Sheriff’s Department records revealed tvo pieces of information of
interest in the Cope case. First, on June 12, 193**, Sheriff Rippey requested
a reduction for time served in Cope’s sentence vhich vas to run until August,

Ill

As a farmer, Cope had tasted success.

He resided and farmed in Union

township in southeastern Plymouth County, near the town of Kingsley.

He

owned only eighty acres of land himself, but farmed across the road from
his father and younger brother.

Cope was primarily a hog producer and

apparently an ingenious operator.

He invented a hog house door which re

ceived a patent in July, 1933.^

Following the assault on Judge Bradley,

a reporter from the Omaha World-Herald visited Cope’s father.

The reporter

found that Jacob Cope had farmed on the same location for twenty-five years
as one of northwest Iowa’s most prosperous farmers.
featured a large eighteen room house.

The Cope farmstead

Until just prior to the agricultural

uprising^ Jacob Cope had held 550 acres of excellent farm land.^

However,

on January 9, 1932, the elder Cope had 510 acres of mortgaged land fore
closed.^

By the planting season of 1932, he had been reduced to forty

acres of farm land because he could not meet mortgage and tax payments.
Moreover, Cope was embittered because he had acquired his land immediately
after World War I and felt the debts he incurred were honest debts.
1933, those debts had rendered him a poor and downcast man.^

By

The father

193*+. Second, a letter written on May 8 , 1933, from C. W. McNaughton, state
agent in charge of the Plymouth County investigation, to Park A. Findley,
head of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigations, suggests a protective
attitude about local tenant farmers, and some informal leadership on Cope’s
behalf. Cope wrote a letter threatening a Colorado tenant planning to move
to Plymouth County. In later trial testimony, five witnesses acknowledged
that the letter, signed by the Farmers* Holiday Association, was the work
of Cope. Plymouth County Sheriff Department Criminal Files, File Number
105 and 106, LeMars, Iowa.
^ 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 18-19.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July U, 1933.

6**0maha World Herald, May 1, 1933, p. 2.
^ Plymouth County Transfer of Lands, Book Number 5, Court House, LeMars,
Iowa, p. 6 .
Omaha World Herald, May 1, 1933, p. 2.
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hoped to leave his 550 acres unencumbered to his sons. ' But by 1932 and

1933 there vas little left for inheritance.
life’s work lost in a few short years.

The father had seen much of a

The son had seen

his hope for the

future wiped out by depression conditions.
With this background, Morris Cope embarked on desperate actions in
1933.

Wallace Short later summarized what vas probably felt by Cope and

others like him.

Commenting on the agricultural rebellion and hard times,

Short argued that "at such times men turn their backs

on the question vhat

is legal, and act vith energy and conviction on theirsense of vhat is
right.

Certainly Morris Cope vas one of the most energetic of the rural

insurgents of the 1930s.

His case vas, if not representative, surely in-

dicative of the desperation of activist farmers in Plymouth County.
In summary, then vho vere the men vho rebelled in the agrarian upris
ing in Plymouth County?

First and foremost, they vere local farmers, albeit

a small percentage of the county’s agrarian population.

Compared to the

best estimates on the age of farmers throughout the midvest uprising, Plym
outh County farmers identified as being involved in the rebellion vere
relatively younger.

Significantly, a majority of these individuals hailed

from a concentrated area in the southeastern section of the county.
owning vas not a common trait among them.

Land

However, more than one-fourth of

those farmers involved appeared likely to inherit family property.

Report

ing on the farm crisis in 1933, Bruce Bliven concluded that those vho
^Tjames R. Parker, "The Farm Holiday Movement In Northwest Iowa,"
Unpublished Research Paper, Drake University, (Des Moines: Iova State
Historical Library, 1968), p. 38.
^®Short, Just One American, p. 1,53.
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rebelled were "farmers who had something a few years ago, and have had it
69
suddenly taken away."
County.

This journalist's observation applied to Plymouth

Although not all who rebelled were property holders threatened

with loss of land, many saw their expectations for future property quickly
dashed by the agricultural depression.

This feature of property expecta

tion on the part of an element of farm rebels in Plymouth County suggests
a qualification of Shover*s view that the 1930s farm rebellion was one of
property holders.

70

^Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 64.
70

Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. 9*

CHAPTER VI

POLITICS OF REBELLION

An extended study of the farm xebellion in Plymouth County should
treat important local political developments.

Significant political de

velopments in this county fall into two categories.

Of primary importance,

the county experienced a major change in voting behavior prior to and dur
ing the years of agricultural discontent.

Second, representatives of the

Communist Party appeared in the county during the rebellion.

Examination

of these political factors may provide additional insight into the farm
revolt in Plymouth County in 1932-33.
Iowa had been a traditionally Republican state and it voted overwhelm
ingly in the Republican column in presidential elections from 1896 through
1928.1

Reflecting this state-wide pattern, Plymouth County had also voted

staunchly Republican since Populist days.^

Starting in 192**, signs of

voter discontent emerged in the county, which lingered until the end of
the decade.

In the election of 1930, the county threw over its traditional

Republican heritage in favor of the Democratic Party.

Throughout the years

^Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1898-1932, (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 193*0, p. 6l.
^Even in the 1892 election when the Populists fielded James B. Weaver
as a candidate, Iowa voted strongly Republican and gave Weaver, a native
son, less than 5 percent of its popular vote. John D. Hicks, The Populist
Revolt, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 196l), p. 263.

II1*
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of the farm rebellion, Plymouth County retained its nevly found political
a l i g n m e n t

The political change in the county, strongly influenced by

rural voters, reflected the stirrings of American agriculture in "the early
1930s.
Americans elected Calvin Coolidge to the Presidency in 192^.

The

Republican scored almost a two-to-one margin of victory over Democratic
candidate John Davis, while Progressive candidate Robert La Follette placed
third.1* Iova voters also responded favorably to the Coolidge candidacy
and gave him a tvo-to-one margin of victory.
vas La Follette.

However, their second choice

Receiving over 100,000 votes less than "the Progressive

candidate, Democrat John Davis finished third in Iova.'*
strong shoving for La Follette vas not so unusual.

Perhaps Iowa’s

After all, as Arthur

$4. Schlesinger, Jr. pointed out, the 192h Progressive campaign "centered
its whole appeal around the farmers’ sense of inequality."^

Responding

"to that appeal, five Iova counties voted a plurality for La Follette and
another five counties narrowly voted a plurality for Coolidge over La
Follette by less than two percentage points.
Plymouth County.^

Among the later group vas

Of these ten politically divergent counties, Plymouth

and Crawford vere later significantly involved in the farm rebellion.
^Robinson, The Presidential Vote

1896-1932. pp. 83-85.

14John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy. 1921-1933. (New York:
Row, i 960), p. 102.
^Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1925-26, p. 537.
^Schlesinger, Crisis of Old Order, p. 105.
^Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1925-26, pp. 536-37.
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Available evidence for Plymouth County suggests that the vote for La
Follette vas primarily rural.
cincts.

In 192U, the county had thirty voting pre

Eight of the precincts vere influenced or dominated by a sizable

town population.
sively rural.

The remaining tventy-tvo precincts vere almost exclu

In the 192k election, fifteen of the rural precincts voted

a. plurality for La Follette, but only one of the eight tovn precincts
Q
voted a La Follette plurality.
The noteworthy feature of the 192U elec
tion in Plymouth County vas that a traditionally Republican county expe
rienced a significant change in voter behavior.
the political change in the county.

Rural areas dominated

The motivating force for the change

van apparently agricultural discontent vhich ran deep enough to drive
voters from Republican ranks.

Hovever, voters did not cross over from

Republican to Democrat , but rather crossed all the way over to a third
political movement.

The seeds of voter unrest vere thus apparent in Plym

outh County by 192*+.
In 1928, Plymouth County continued to deviate from the Iova political
mainstream.

In that year the nation overwhelmingly elected Herbert Hoover

to the presidency, giving him 58 percent of the popular vote.^
Republican Iowa provided Hoover 62 percent of its vote.

Strongly

Hovever, six

counties in the Havkeye State voted a majority for the Democratic candi
date, A1 Smith.

Of the six, Audubon, Carrol, Crawford, Plymouth and Shelby

vere in the vestern portion of the state.

Only highly Catholic Dubuque

County vas outside the area of strongest farm rebellion in subsequent
8rbid., pp. 530-31.
^Schlesinger, Crisis of Old Order, p. 129.
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years.

Of the six counties that voted for Smith, only Audubon and Plym

outh had been staunchly Republican since the Populist days.

Therefore,

the change in those counties' voting patterns represented a significant
political realignment.

Perhaps the La Follette vote in 192*+ was a transi-

tional stage in the eventual switch to the Democrats. 11

In two consecutive

presidential elections, Plymouth and Crawford Counties demonstrated voting
behavior that strayed from their traditional local politics.

It may be

significant that these were the same counties that experienced martial law
during the farm revolt of 1933*
In the 1928 election, Plymouth County's farm vote again explained the
altered voting pattern of the county.

Of the twnety-two exclusively rural

precincts in the county, thirteen reported a majority for Smith.

Only two

of the eight town-influenced precincts cast a majority for the Democratic
candidate.^
Iowa's gubernatorial election in 1928 was easily won by the Republican
candidate.

Only nine counties, Including Plymouth, voted for the Democratic

candidate.

Again dominated by rural precinct majorities for the Democratic

candidate, Plymouth County cast the state's fourth greatest percentage vote
■^Whitney, Iowa Official Register, 1929-30» PP* *+22-23.
■^Robinson, Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, pp. 83-83 . Another study,
related to the 192*+ vote in Pittsburgh, suggests that the La Follette vote
in that city was a step in the transition from a traditional. Republican voting
posture to the Democratic party by the 1932 election. Perhaps a similar
transition was present in Plymouth County. See Bruce M. Stave, "The 'La
Follette Revolution’ and the Pittsburgh Vote, 1932»” Mid America *+9 (Octo
ber, 1967): 2*+*+-51.
"^Whitney, Iowa Official Register, 1929-30* PP. *+17-18. Although
covering a different time period, an excellent discussion of the voting
behavior differences and political animosity between the farmer and the
villager can be found In Stanley B. Parsons, "Who Were The Nebraska Pop
ulists?" Nebraska History *+*+ (June, 19&3)* 85-92. One can speculate
that similar forces that pitted farmer against townsmen In the 1890s
persisted into the Depression years of the 1930s *

for the Democratic gubernatorial aspirant.1^

Hovever, the county's polit

ical turn-about was not thoroughgoing in 1928. Plymouth County voted
heavily for a Republican congressional candidate in that year.

With the

exception of the governor's race, the county vote for all other state
offices favored the Republican candidates.

lli

At the local level, there

vere nine politically contested county offices in 1928.

In those elections,

Plymouth County elected eight Republicans and only one Democrat.

In addi

tion, the county elected a Republican state senator and state representa
tive. ^

By 1928, Plymouth County displayed a significant change in polit

ical behavior, indicative of discontent, and this change vas grounded in the
farm precincts of the county.

But the discontent vas not thorough enough

to change the political complexion of the county entirely.

Hovever, as the

depression mounted, Plymouth County continued to undergo political altera
tions .
In the 1930 local elections, Plymouth County took a decided turn
tovard the Democratic Party.

Of the nine county officials elected, five

vere Democrats vhich represented an increase of four Democratic county
officers over 1928.

And in terms of county officials, Plymouth became the

most Democratic county in northwest Iova.^

Plymouth County also elected

a Democratic state representative in 1930.^

Hovever, in statewide elec

tions Plymouth County continued to vote Republican.

\

The county Joined

13Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1929-30, pp. UlT-l8 and l+2l*-25.
-

-

-r- t - r —

-

lkTbid. , pp. 1*17-18 and 1*35.

^ Ibid.9 pp. 195 and 203-06.
^■^Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1931-32, p. 189.

17lbid., p. 209.
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the rest of the state in electing Republican Governor Dan Turner and a host
of other Republican state officers.

Turner, however, won only a narrow

victory in Plymouth County with one-half of the rural precincts voting for
the Democratic candidate.

18

By 1932, the economic depression dominated the political scene.
wide, the Democrats swept into political office.

Nation

In Plymouth County, the

movement to the Democratic Party was also exceptionally strong.

This polit

ical movement occurred between the farm strike of autumn and the anti-foreclosure campaign of the winter of 1933.

Led by the farm vote, the political,

change in Plymouth County reflected the frustration of rebellious farmers.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrats swept into office in 1933.

In

the presidential election Roosevelt garnered 59 percent of the popular
vote.-*-9 Even traditionally reliable Republican strongholds fell to the
Democrats.

I6wa, which had voted Republican in nine previous presidential

elections, also gave 59 percent of its popular vote to Roosevelt. 2 0
Plymouth County made almost a complete transition to the Democratic
Party in 1932.
no surprise.

To local observers, the altered political climate came as
As early as March, 1932, the county’s chief newspaper pre-

dieted a Democratic sweep locally.

21

In the presidential election results,

Plymouth County gave Roosevelt a three-to-one victory margin.

Only two

counties in Iowa exceeded Plymouth’s overwhelming Roosevelt vote.22
l8Ibid., pp. U29-30.
^Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Dead., p. IT.
^Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, pp. 6l and 193.
2-^LeMars Globe-Post, March 21, 1932.
2^Lester W. Drennen, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1933-3**, (Des
Moines: State of Iowa, 1933), pp. 2i+6-UT.
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in the cases of both Carroll and Dubuque Counties, there had been an estab
lished history of Democratic voting.23 Plymouth County, on the other hand,
had surrendered its traditional Republican posture and produced one of the
greatest margins of victory for Roosevelt in the state of Iova.
precinct in the county voted a majority for Roosevelt.

Oh

Every

.

In other 1932 election contests as veil, Plymouth County changed to a
nev political persuasion.

Iova elected Democrat Clyde Herring governor vith

a 53 percent majority vote.^

Plymouth County gave Herring 66 percent of

its gubernatorial vote, and the county voted vith the majority for seven
other Democratic state office contenders. Furthermore, the county sent a
of*
Democratic representative to Congress by a bvo-to-one margin of victory.^0

Locally, Plymouth County selected nine county officials.

Democrats

von seven of the races as the county continued its 1930 distinction as the
most Democratically controlled county in northvest Iova.

The county*s

voters also elected a Democratic state senator and elected as state repre
sentative a local farmer and Democrat.2?
Overall, the county’s voting behavior may be instructive in attempting
to comprehend the local farmers* rebellion.

The voting transition vhich

began in 192U, culminated in 1932 amidst vigorous rural insurgency.

The

Republicans had not met the farmers* demands, thus they turned to the
Democrats for solutions.

Perhaps the political behavior of Plymouth County

^Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, pp. 83-85.

2**Drennen, Iova Official Register, 1933-3^, p. 2kl,
25rbid., p. 2U9 .

26Ibid., p. 2Ul.
2?Ibid., pp. 72-73 and 127.
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farmers vas the logical result of an agrarian thinking that, by the 1920s,
demanded governmental intervention in the farm problem.
place, farmers agitated for governmental action.

At the polling

Shortly after the 1932

election Milo Reno stated that "We are asking the government to regulate
the prices in this basic American industry. . . . We intend to keep on
o (i

agitating until ve get justice."

In this spirit, rural Plymouth County

voters agitated for relief from their plight in elections from 192^ to
1932.29
In addition to voting behavior alterations, the presence of the Com
munist Party in the Plymouth County area during the farm rebellion deserves
attention.

Speculation about Communist involvement in the Iova farm rebel

lion emerged in the early stages of the uprising.

During the milk strike

around Council Bluffs, Pottavattomie County Sheriff Pat Lainson suspected
Communists among the picketers.-^

In the LeMars region, a local newspaper

leveled charges of Communist infiltration at area farm meetings.31

When

2&Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 63.
^ P l y m o u t h CountyTs political divergence during the farm revolt years
continued until 1936. In the 1936 election, the county again strongly
supported Roosevelt. Of additional interest in the 1936 election,Plymouth
County voters gave William Lemke of the Union Party 11.3 percent of their
vote. Only one other county in Iova exceeded Plymouth’s support for Lemke.
Statewide,2.6 percent of the vote went to Lemke and,nationally, only 1.9
percent voted for Lemke. Again, in 1936, Plymouth County’s voting behavior
took on exceptional characteristics. Drennen, Iowa Official Register, 193738, pp. 312-13; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal. 1932-19**0. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 195;
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, i9 6 0 ), p. 6U2; and Edvard C. Blackorby, Prairie Rebel:
The Public Life of William Lemke, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1963), pp. 227-29.

^^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 77.
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 16, 1932.
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the Plymouth County revolt turned to violence in the spring of 1933, claims
of Communist influence intensified.

During investigation into the assault •

on Judge Bradley, officialdom seemed preoccupied with the Communist threat.
In a letter to Governor Herring, Iowa Assistant Attorney General L. W.
Powers reported on the situation in LeMars, claiming that "these men openly
assert that their purpose is to overthrow the government, and unfortunately
they have received a lot of aid and encouragement out of Sioux City."32
Confirmation of the Communist presence came shortly thereafter when Attorney
0
General E. L. O'Connor announced the discovery of a Communist headquarters
in Sioux City.^3

Later, 0 1Connor blamed the episodes at both Primghar and

LeMars on Communist

p r o m o t e r s .

3^

But despite the claims of a Communist

role in the farm rebellion, no proof of Communist instigation surfaced. 35
'
Communist presence in and around Plymouth County was undeniable.

An

appreciation for the Communist existence can be gained through an examina
tion of the Communist Party's official position on the agrarian rebellion.
John Shover investigated Communist Party involvement in the depression era
rural insurgency, and found that the Communist Party's program for agricul
ture was ennunciated at its 1930 convention.

Basically, the Communists

acknowledged their previous lack of attention to the agrarian problem and
32l . W. Powers to Governor Clyde Herring, May 3, 1933, Governor Clyde
Herring Papers, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Librar
ies, Iova City, Iowa.
33Dileva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa," p. 109.
3^0'Brien County Bell, May 10, 1933.
35Dileva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa," p. 139*
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resolved to actively* pursue a revolutionary* program on the farm front.

36

In viev of agriculture's economic dilemma, Communist leader Earl Browder
spoke for the party* when he reported to the convention that "conditions
among the farmers are ripe for us."

3T

In initiating their agrarian policy,

the Communists developed a plan known as the "draft program."

Their plan

foresaw the coming farm revolt as one of property holdersversus
nomic system which had driven them to

d e s p a i r .

an eco

3®

The major personalities involved in the Communist's agrarian efforts
were a cadre of well-established Party regulars.

Harold Ware, experienced

in the Party's agricultural interests, oversaw the rural program.
Harris was the chief field man on the rural front.39

Lem

Finally, Ella Reeve

Bloor, Ware's mother, managed local rural organizing drives with her hus
band Andrew Omholt.^

But before this group could fully swing into action,

the rural revolt began in earnest with the farm strike of August and Sep
tember,- 1932.

Recognizing Sioux City as the center of the rebellion, the

Communists moved to action in the Sioux City area in an attempt to catch
a revolt that was running ahead of them.

bl

3^Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest FarmCrisis,"

p. 250.

3?Earl Browder, "Report of Political Committee To Plenum," The Com
munist 10 (January, 1931): 18.
3®Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 250.

39Ibid., pp. 250-51.
^Ella Reeve Bloor, We Are Many, (New York: International Publishers,
19^0), pp. 231-32; and Lem Harris, "Communists In Farm Struggles,” Political
Affairs 58 (August-September, 1979): 67.
^Shover, "Communist Party and the Midvest Farm Crisis," p. 252.
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The Communist Party’s newspaper, the Daily Worker, quickly announced
support for the strike movement, but suggested that farmers broaden their
struggle and aim it at banks and the taxation system as veil as the market
place. U pc

Later, in an editorial, the Daily Worker urged farmers to unite

vith the vorking class to enlarge their movement.

Perhaps most important,

"the Communist paper denounced farm organizations, including the Farmers'
Union, because "everyone of these organizations is carrying out the policy
of Wall Street."

Rather than blindly follow the existing farm organiza

tions , the Daily Worker encouraged farmers to establish local committees
of action to carry the fight.

Communist condemnation of farm groups even

carried to the Farmers' Holiday Association itself, when the Daily Worker
urged striking farmers to ignore Milo Reno's call for the end of the strike
prior to the Sioux City Governors' Conference
The first indication of actual Communist presence in the farm strike
in Plymouth County came in mid-August, 1932.

Sam Mosher, Plymouth County

Farmers' Holiday Association member and leader of the milk strike, informed
the local press that "Communists tried to horn in on the milk strike in the
last U8 hours."^5

The Communists reportedly offered assistance in the dis

tribution of dairy products to the needy during the strike and volunteered
to lead more drastic actions including dumping milk, overturning trucks,
^ Daily Worker, August 18, 1932.
1|3Ibid. , August 19, 1932.
k^Ibid., September 2, 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
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and halting railroad milk shipments.^

In an interview with 0. N. Kelly,

a Plymouth County Holiday member, Lowell Dyson found that local farmers
conversed vith Harold Ware and other Party members during the farm strike,
hut were not swayed by them.^
When the farm strike waned in September, the Communists capitalized
on the Sioux City Governor's Conference, in an attempt to strengthen their
operation.

Approximately 15,000 farmers attended a parade and rally on

September 9.

The assembly, organized for the convening governors by the
J
,Q

Farmers* Holiday Association, was to symbolize the farmers' plight.
Capitalizing on the farmers' protest, the Communists, under the direction
of Ware and Mother Bloor, organized a meeting of approximately fifty farm
ers.

The only significant development was a call for a farmers' march on
llO
Washington, D. C., in December. ^
The march on Washington held importance for the farm revolt around
Sioux City.

At the Washington conference, the Communists established the

Farmers' National Committee for Action as the organization to coordinate
local committees for action.^

The Farmers' National Committee established

a local office in Sioux City and conducted rural organizing efforts in the
Sioux City territory from this office.^
**6Ibid.
^Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 8U.
^^Sioux City Journal, September 10, 1932.
^^Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 252; and
Bloor, We Are Many, pp. 23^-35.
^Shover, "Communist Party in the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 257.
5lBloor, We Are Many, p. 238.
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Mother Bloor spent much of the autumn of 1932 involved in the Com
munist* s presidential election campaign in nearby North and South

D a k o t a *

52

After she attended the Washington conference, she embarked on a speaking
tour of the Sioux ,City area.

Her return to western Iowa coincided with,

but was unrelated to, the outbreak of anti-foreclosure sales. J

One of

Mother Bloor*s addresses reportedly attracted 1,000 farmers in LeMars on
January 7, 1933.

Earlier in the day, many of the same farmers had halted

a local foreclosure sale.

At the LeMars gathering, Bloor was able to rally

numerous local farmers in support of a march on the state capital.

How

ever, the local Holiday Association countered by condemning the march and
suggesting that farmers could better serve their purposes locally by halt
ing foreclosure sales.5^

Apparently, the Communists were still recognized

and treated as outsiders during the winter of 1933 in Plymouth County. 55
Following the attack on Judge Bradley in April, 1933, there was a
brief contact between Plymouth County farmers and the Communists.

The

night after the National Guard arrived in the county, several local farm
ers approached Mother Bloor at her Sioux City headquarters seeking man
power and arms with which to resist the National Guard.

Bloor convinced

the farmers that local rallies and protests to the governor against the
use of the National Guard were better solutions to their problems.5^
52Ibid., pp. 231-32.
53shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 258.
5^LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 1933.
55shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 258.
5^Bloor, We Are Many, pp. 237-38.
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1962, Dyson interviewed Otto Anstrom who was present at Bloor*s headquar
ters that night and he independently confirmed Bloorfs account of events
Three days after the encounter between Plymouth County farmers and Mother
Bloor, -the National Guard raided the small Communist headquarters in Sioux
City and arrested four workers.
hended.

58

Mother Bloor was not among those appre-

Before the raid, however, the Communists had sent a letter of

protest to Governor Herring on behalf of Plymouth County farmers.

The

letter condemned Herring for using "the National Guard as a collection
agency for the Wall Street bankers and their powerful insurance companies."59
During the formal investigation into the Plymouth County disturbance,
numerous charges of Communist involvement arose.

The preceding information

appears to be the extent of Communist presence in and around Plymouth County.
The Communist Party was present and tried to organize local farmers, however,
its position in the local rebellion was peripheral and the overall impact
was marginal.

Specifically, Communist ineffectiveness in Plymouth County

can be traced to two causes.

First, the Party never led, but rather fol

lowed farmer activism in the local rebellion.

Second, the Communists1 did

not understand the local, limited nature of the Plymouth County unrest.
In the major events of the local insurgency, the farmers provoked
-actions on which the Communists attempted to capitalize.

The August, 1932,

Holiday and milk strike were in progress when CommunistsJoined the
^Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. l8k.
5^Sioux City Journal, May 2, 1933.
^Farmers* National Committee for Action, Sioux City, to Governor Herring,
Herring Papers.
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struggle.^0

Plymouth County farmers had also effectively conducted their

first anti-foreclosure tactics prior to Communist aid and guidance in that
area.^1

Moreover, after the assault on Judge Bradley, local farmers ap

pealed to Mother Bloor for assistance rather than the Communists reaching
out to assist the desperate farmers. 62

While Bloor and Ware vere present

during the Governors* Conference in Sioux City, they determined that farm
ers in that territory vere organized and they saw "more chance of making
gains" vith a nevly forming group of Nebraska farmers

Apparently the

Communists turned their attention to areas vhere they could lead or have
more influence rather than areas vhere farmers appeared already organized.
Second, the Plymouth County revolt vas aimed at short-range goals
and parochial concerns.

The Communists, as early as 1930, had announced

that "the immediate task of the Communist Party is to bring class strug
gle into agriculture."^

But there vas not a great deal, of Plymouth

County farmer interest in affairs beyond the immediate area.

They desired

improved prices for agricultural produce and the maintenance of their
farms.

In this spirit, the Holiday, the milk strike, and the anti-fore

closure crusade vere conducted for local gains.

When farmers vere urged

by Mother Bloor to organize for a march on the state capitol, the Plymouth
^LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
^ I b i d ., January 9> 1933.
^2Bloor, We Are Many, pp. 237-38.
63Lement Harris, Harold M. Ware (1890-1935): Agricultural Pioneer,
USA and USSR, (Nev Yoriki American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1978),
p. 6l; and Shover, "Communist Party and the Midvest Farm Crisis,” pp. 25355.
^ T h e Communist, 9 (April, 1930):

372.
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County Holiday president quickly dashed the effort by pressing the farm
ers to "stay right here and vatch Plymouth

C o u n t y . "^5

The overall Commun

ist program vas out of step with Plymouth County farmers1 goals.

The

Party had a long range plan vith national goals that vere intended to
eventually revolutionize American agriculture.^

But little in the broad

Communist program appealed to the immediate and particular demands of Plym
outh County farmers.
In a general, sense, the Communists failed to gain significant influ
ence in the Plymouth County farm rebellion because they did not understand
the midvestern agrarian mind.

Commenting on farmer receptivity to com

munism in 1933, the editors of The Nation suggested that "most of them
have never heard of Karl Marx, or if they have, think he is a brother of
Grocho."^

The editors’ sarcasm belied the intelligence of Iova farmers.

Farmers were sensitive to charges of Communist association and distrustful
ZTQ
of outside leadership.
In February, 1933, Reno indicated a concern about
Communist involvement, fearing "that Russian Communists are endeavoring to
gain a foothold in the Holiday Association and either control or destroy
it."^9

Later Reno warned farmers of their two enemies; the capitalistic

group and the "more vicious" Communists.*^®

The LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel

provided an indication of anti-Communist sentiment on the local level by
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 1933.
cc
Shover, "Communist Party and the Midvest Farm Crisis," p. 250.
6?The Nation, May 17, 1933, p. 5^.
6®Shover,

"Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 26l.

^Reno to Jake Taylor, February 20, 1933, Reno Papers.
7QFarm Holiday News, July, 1933.
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portraying Communism as a "snake in the grass'* in a cartoon prior to the
farm strike of 1932.^*

Striking farmers often quickly rejected Communist

aid when the farm strike began, and were careful to prevent outside or
Communist influence at meetings where picketing votes were taken.^

In

the LeMars area, the Communists saw a fertile field for their revolution
ary program, but because they mis gauged rural sentiment they had a very
small impact on the local rebellion.^
Perhaps Ware struck a sensitive cord in his own analysis of the Com
munist position in the farm rebellion.

The Farmers* Holiday Association

threatened another farm strike in May, 1933.

Pending the outcome of the

agricultural legislation then being debated in Congress, and because of
the recent violence around LeMars, Milo Reno led an effort to stall the
planned May 13 strike.^

Ware prepared to blast Reno editorially in the

Farmers * National Weekly.^

But when Ware travelled to Iowa, visited with

farmers, and heard Reno's speeches, he changed his approach.

He notified

the editor of the Farmers' National Weekly,
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 8, 1932.
^2Sioux City Journal, August 15* 1932, p. 8; and Korgan, "Farmers
Picket The Depression," p. 79.
"^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," pp. 189-90.
f^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 13^-35.
^Lement Harris, Harold M. .Ware (1890-1935): Agricultural Pioneer,
pp. 62-6U. Ware had long believed that the key to organizing an effective
Communist movement in the countryside was in formulating the right type
of farm publication. At the Communist-sponsored Farmers' National Relief
Conference held in Washington in December, 1932, organizers launched the
Farmers' National Weekly as the hoped-for farm publication. The paper
began publication on January 30, 1933* with Ware giving close attention
to editorials and circulation.
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Don't print
have got to
to attack.
ity of Iowa
them— until
ends.76

the next issue until you get my full report I We
ahout faceJ I was all wet on planning to continue
Reno personifies their movement to the great major
farmers. To attack him personally is to attack
he slips again— as he will when his latest truce

Ware's comment is instructive.

Although Holiday Association leadership

did not have firm control of the farm rebellion it had initiated, Reno
and other leaders apparently did express fundamental ideals that
appealed to many agrarian rebels.
In terms of political behavior, one point is clear about Plymouth
County.

The county's farmers were essentially a conservative body.

Even

though some rural elements diverged politically to vote for La Follette
in 1924, and Lemke in 193&, the dominant tendency was adherence to the
two major political parties.

That the Communists failed to achieve

significant inroads in the county is a further indication of political
conservatism.

In conclusion, Plymouth County farmers sought improved

agricultural prices and security on their farms, not political revolution.

76Ibid., p. 64.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION
In its most successful phase, the Farmers* Holiday Association gained
important attention for its actions in Plymouth County, Iova, from August,
1932, to April, 1933.

After the violence in the spring of 1933, the Holi

day movement lost support and slowly faded in Plymouth County.

Perhaps

rank and file farmers in the Holiday group were driven off "by the violence.
Certainly, by the autumn of 1933, popular sentiment in the county turned
against the Holiday* s renewed effort at striking,when "Law and Order
Leagues” emerged under the auspices of the county sheriff.

These leagues,

led by H. W. Brosamle and containing 500 members, opened roads as small
numbers of Holiday picketers tried once again to prevent the flow of farm
produce to market.1

Even I. W. Reck, one of the leaders of the previous

year*s milk strike, Joined the law and order group and denounced the new
Holiday effort, exhorting local farmers instead to ’’get their feet on the
o
ground.”
John Shover has concluded that the abortive strike attempt in
the autumn of 1933 bordered on lunacy and extremism.

-a

Exemplifying this

extremism, Roy Martin of Kingsley vas arrested and convicted for carrying
^LeMars Globe-Post, November 9, 1933.
^Ibid., November 16 , 1933.
•^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 1U9-6T.
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a gun as he and other Holiday members crashed a meeting in which the Sioux
City Milk Producers were voting non-support for the strike.1*
The changing agriculture picture probably also hindered the Holiday’s
1933 strike effort.

As local c o m prices rose from twenty-two cents per

bushel in late April to thirty-nine cents by the end of July, some farmers
undoubtedly saw a brighter day ahead for agriculture.

5

Reflecting the

shift in northwest Iowa farmers’ attitudes, the secretary of the local Sioux
City Holiday Association resigned his post in order to take a position with
the recently formed Agricultural Adjustment Administration.^

The impact of

the New Beal agricultural program was noticeable in Plymouth County, as the
LeMars Globe-Post admonished farmers to sign up for the corn-hog program,
asserting that ’'when you have a chance to get Uncle Sam’s check for any
where from $300 to $1,000, and even more, there’s something wrong with you
if you don’t take it."?

Later the local Holiday Association, itself, met

to hear president C. J. Schultz discuss how the cora-hog program would help
Q
farmers.
The combination of anti-Holiday sentiment, and an improved agri
cultural outlook, eased the Farmers’ Holiday Association from center-stage.
But in its heyday, the Holiday in Plymouth County illustrated features of
an important rural rebellion that should not escape historical attention.
The assembly and management of crowds of farmers for direct action
purposes was no small accomplishment.

With crowds reaching perhaps as many

^LeMars Globe-Post, November 23, 1933.
5Ibid., July 27, 1933.
^Ityson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 252.
7LeMars Globe-Post, November 16, 1933.
®Ibid., December h , 1933.
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as 1500 in number, and composed almost totally of farmers, the 1930s*
activism in Plymouth County became a significant protest movement.9

George

Rude has studied crowds in history and found a popular tradition in direct
action rural protest.

In investigations of rural crowds in England and

France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Rude has concluded that
the protests stemmed directly from conditions related to livelihood and
economics.

Citing the specific case of crowds during the French Revolu

tion, Rude points out that they were "composed of ordinary men and women
with varying social needs, who responded to a variety of impulses."^1
Bearing in mind the general, farm strike, the milk strike, penny-sales, and
the anti-foreclosure movement, all conducted by local, farmers, the farm
revolt in Plymouth County would seem to fit a broad historical pattern of
crowd behavior and rural protest.
necessity, be tentative.

Conclusions on this point must, of

But, the general characteristics and importance

of the crowd phenomenon suggests there might be implications for the Plym
outh County Farmers* Holiday movement beyond the confines of the county and
its activism of the 1930s.
Individually, farmers in Plymouth County could not contend with the
impersonal economic conditions of the 1930s.

Rapidly declining commodity

prices, bank closings, and an avalanche of farm foreclosures, left many
farmers destitute.

In these circumstances, there was a strong movement

toward organization by local farmers.

This organizational tendency fit

9Ibid., August 15, 1932.

-^Rude, The Crowd In Hi story« pp. 35-^.
^Rude, The Crowd In The French Revolution, pp. 232-33.
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an agrarian tradition since the beginning of this society*s industrial
age.-*-2

Plymouth County farmers showed an exceptional turn toward organi

zation in the 1930s.

In 1931, the county ranked second in Iowa in in

creased membership in the Farmers1 Union, and fifth in total membership
in what then was Iowa*s largest member farm organization.^

At the peak

of i;he farmer activism in January, 1933, Plymouth County ranked fourth
in total Iowa Farmers* Union membership.^

With the Farmers* Union serv

ing as the unofficial parent organization of the Farmers* Holiday Associa
tion, local farmers looked to cooperative action for resolution of their
problems.^

In the tradition of the Grange, the Alliance, and the Popu

list movements, the Holiday Association applied a collective rural approach
to the problems of the depression.

Although extreme in some of its views,

the Holiday movement, epitomized by the activities in Plymouth County,
illustrated a continuation of the important organizational theme in the
American agrarian tradition.
In terms of leadership, another feature of the Plymouth County Holi
day movement reflected the heritage of agrarian organizations.

During

the rural unrest of the late nineteenth century, agricultural leadership
came primarily from the farm.

Although there was a tendency toward a

professional guidance in the early twentieth century, much agricultural
leadership still consisted of real farmers.

Writing about the depression

•^Hayes, The Response To Industrialism, pp. 58-63.
^ipva Union Farmer, January 13, 1932.
^Ibid., January 25, 1933.
^McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy, p. 68.
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farm revolt, Paul Johnstone suggests that "probably no movement vas ever
more genuinely indigenous than the farm-holiday movement of the early
1 9 3 0 s . M i l o Reno himself certainly upheld the role of a genuine ruralbased leader.^

In Plymouth County, the Holiday leadership, both formal

and informal, consisted of real farmers threatened by the depression.

Ex

amination of the local Holiday movement makes for an engaging study of an
important rebellion.

Perhaps more important, hovever, is the appreciation

to be gained in examining ordinary people, led by real farmers, as they
agitated for immediate relief from their desperate condition.
One further trait of the Holiday uprising, reminiscent of earlier
agrarian crusades, vas the division of the movement into two clear fac
tions ; one seeking short-range solutions and the other demanding longrange agricultural reform.

18

Milo Reno*s "cost-of-production” ideal of

the 1930s, not unlike the "free coinage of silver” in the Populist move
ment, served as a rallying cry for economically depressed farmers.

Hovever,

when a measure of economic improvement and security emerged in 1933 in the
form of mortgage moratorium lavs and some increase in prices, support for
Reno’s longer range agricultural reform waned.

In a similar fashion, as

agricultural prices moved upward in 1896, the Populists lost support for
their broader agrarian reform ideas. 19

The defection from the Holiday in

the face of an improved agricultural outlook has already been pointed out.
Johnstone, ”01d Ideals Versus New Ideas,” p. 157*
IT

Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 25-

l8Ibid., p. 206.
^ H o f s t a d t e r , The Age of Reform, pp. 109-11.
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A general significance may be found in the tendency of agrarian organiza
tions to thrive in crisis situations vhen rank and file farmers are moved
by immediate and particular problems.

However, genuine enthusiasm for

long-range agricultural reform fades quickly in the presence of even modest
economic gains.

The case of the Plymouth County Holiday in the 1930s clear

ly lends credence to this inclination in American agrarian movements.
Motivated by the desire for economic stability, it is probable that
the agrarian rebellion in Plymouth County in the 1930s was basically a main
stream agricultural movement.

Some of the rhetoric and actions of the rural

revolt took on extreme characteristics, but the depth of feeling in such
expressions is questionable.

For example, C. J. Schultz, excited by success

when the Holiday stopped a foreclosure sale and temporarily bested a cred
itor, wrote to Milo Reno boasting, "who said we can’t drive the fear of
God into those robbers and cutthroats." 20

However, although local farmers

resorted to bold direct action, and occasional violence, they were gener
ally law-abiding mainstream types.

Following the prevention of a fore

closure sale in January, 1933, LeMars Globe-Post editor R. F. Starzl was
invited to write a guest editorial for the New York Times. In his editor
ial, Starzl noted that the assembled crowd was dominated by middle-aged,
conservative farmers. The local newspaper suggested that the extent of
radical farmer behavior could be judged by other simultaneous actions.
Therefore, Starzl pointed out that at the same time the farmers prevented
the execution of a legal process, "they obeyed all the no parking signs
21
around the courthouse."
v
Of)

WC. J. Schultz to Milo Reno, January 7, 1933s Reno Papers.

^ New York T i m e s , January 8, 1933, p. E6.
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In making the preceding conclusions about the Plymouth County farm
revolt of 1932-33* one must be cautious.

After all, the events in this

single Iowa county were only a small part of a larger agricultural rebellion
directed against general economic hard times.

But the extent of activity

and basic trends of the rural unrest in the county are worthy of tentative
judgments.
The Holiday activities in Plymouth County served to help focus
national attention on the plight of American agriculture.

Even though the

broad goals of the Farmers’ Holiday Association were not achieved, the
farm srtike and the anti-foreclosure crusade gave an urgency to the
agricultural program of the Roosevelt administration in the spring of
1933.

22
The Plymouth County Farmers* Holiday movement, taken as a microcosm

of agrarian sentiment in the 1930s, is helpful in understanding the
desperation of those years for some elements of American society.

The

drive by common farmers to improve prices and save their farms from fore
closure was consistent with earlier agrarian experiences of protest and
activism.

In this spirit, northwest Iowa farmers were not widely separated

from the likes of Daniel Shays, Pennsylvania whiskey tax rebels, or the
late nineteenth century agrarian movements.

The search by Plymouth

County farmers for remedies to immediate and pressing problems in the
1930s constitutes an important local uprising in the general stream of
farmer activism and the American agrarian heritage.
Leuchtenburg, Franklin.P. Roosevelt and the New Deal, pp. 48^51*
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